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ABSTRACT
This study examines the quality of enlisted marines at
their first-term reenlistment point. Of particular interest
is to identify if a significant difference exists between the
quality of the marines that are retained and the quality of
thost who depart. The analysis differs from previous studies,
in that, performance-based indicators -- proficiency and
conduct marks, awards, and educational improvement -- are used
to measure quality. Also of importance is the development of
a system that can be implemented by Headquarters Marine Corps
to assist in identifying quality individuals. This system
would incorporate performance-based criteria to recognize
qualitative factors. The analysis uses data from fiscal 1982
through 1985 and combines different files available from
Marine Corps sources. Results from the analysis indicate that
there may be a loss of personnel quality at the reenlistment
point. It was concluded that the Marine Corps could berefit
by targeting quality individuals for reenlistment before they
reach their expiration of active service.
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This thesis examines the policies and procedures used to
identify and retain "quality" enlisted marines who reach their
first-term reenlistment decision point. The scope of the
research for this thesis has been limited to first-term non-
prior service enlisted men in the Marine Corps. The focus of
the research centers on developing a computer program (model)
that uses performance-based indicators along with biographical
background data to identify "quality potential" for continued
military service. This type of research will become
increasingly important during the next ten years as force
reductions cause changes within the Marine Corps. These
changes imply some "building down" of the Corps to a size and
structure that is affordable within congressionally allotted
funding levels.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary objectives of this thesis are threefold. The
first objective is to define a "quality" enlisted marine for
the purpose of reenlistment. This definition of "quality"
will differ from the definition used to predict success for
initial enlistees. The use of performance-based indicators,
that is, meritorious promotions, proficiency and conduct
marks, awards, formal school standings, off-duty education,
1
leadership awards --will form the basis of defining "quality
potential" for continued service. The second objective is to
develop a "quality potential" model for use by Headquarters
Marine Corps (HQMC) manpower planners to selectively target
enlisted marines identified as higher-quality candidates for
reenlistment.
A final objective of this thesis is to recommend changes
to current policies and procedures contained in Marine Corps
Order P1040.31F. This directive is called the Career Planning
and Development Guide and it contains the basic eligibility
requirements for reenlistment in the Marine Corps. The aim
of any policy changes would be to apply reenlistment
incentives more efficiently and more equitably.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research questions, central to this thesis,
involve the definition of a "quality" individual and the most
efficient application of reenlistment incentives. Is the
Marine Corps selecting the best qualified marines for
retention? Are the current procedures and policies, used for
reenlistment, misdirected at the margin; that is, are
incentives attracting marines who are eligible for retention
but not the best qualified? What changes can be made to
Marine Corps policies to improve the retention of the best
qualified marines?
Secondary research questions stemming from the primary
questions include: What is the "quality-loss" rate for
2
recruits entering the Marine Corps during fiscal 1985? What
is an acceptable loss rate and what is an unacceptable one?
If a "quality potential" model is developed and implemented,
what will be the long-term effects on the manpower "profile"
of the Marine Corps?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The focus of this study is on the issue of the quality
of the labor supply at the first-term reenlistment point.
Quality is assessed on the basis of an individual's past
performance in the Marine Corps. Because the military career
track is a closed system, there is a limited labor supply.
The objective is to have a selection process that yields the
highest quality of personnel obtainable. This study examines
available information to provide an accurate measure of
quality that goes beyond the criteria currently used for
determining reenlistment eligibility.
2. Limitations
The Marine Corps just recently started to consolidate
all of its available historical information in a computerized
data base. For that reason the study will use historical data
going back to fiscal 1982 to conduct an analysis of quality
loss based on biographical criteria. However, performance-
based analysis will be limited to data beginning in fiscal
1985 because the availability of the data necessary to
construct the performance-based criteria is restricted by data
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base management policies. These policies limit the time
length in which certain data elements are retained within
automated data files.
3. Assumptions
Recent events in the world, lessening tensions between
East and West, German reunification, the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact, and increasing budget constraints at home have
created an unclear picture as to the future of the Armed
Forces in general and the Marine Corps in particular. Even
so, the following basic assumptions can be made with a
reasonable degree of confidence: (a) because of its force
structure, the Marine Corps will never need to reenlist 100
percent of the available labor supply at the first
reenlistment point; (b) anything short of actual war in the
Persian Gulf, the downsizing of the Armed Forces will
continue; and (c) reductions to the Armed Forces spell
reductions in the size of the Marine Corps, though the extent
of the drawdown is still not clear. Looking at past history
as well as present and future commitments, the Commandant's
proposed end strength of no less than 180,000 is considered
a defensible position. (Appleton, 1990)
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
A comprehensive review of related literature was
undertaken. Previous studies that addressed the topic of
"quality" in the Armed Forces primarily focused on attributes
that indicated success of new enlistees. The findings of the
studies were fairly consistent and have proved very effective
in recruiting successful enlistees. However, retention
standards and quality criteria were not specifically
addressed. With the notable exception of one study, previous
studies failed to adequately define "quality" for reenlistees.
This thesis departs from previous research in the method of
defining quality, by attempting to use performance-based
criteria for the identification of quality in determining
reenlistment potential.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
The planning process by whic' the Department of Defense
(DoD) determines manpower and :iateriel requirements is
summarized in the following sec:tion of the thesis. An
understanding of this process along with a brief review of our
nation's budgeting process emphasizes the increased importance
of higher-quality retention in the planning of the Marine
Corps of the 1990s.
Following the section on the planning process, is an
historical review of the individual attributes thit constitute
"quality" for the Armed Services. Past studies conducted on
the topic of "quality" are discussed with emphasis on
5
significant results and applications that have shaped the
structure of our All-Volunteer Force (AVF).
Next, the thesis examines the present AVF with respect to
projected trends in demographics, changing educational
standards and technological skill requirements, and the
reality of manpower reductions. These trends are likely to
create an increased emphasis on an older and higher-quality
career force.
Finally, this thesis defines "quality potential" for
enlisted male marines at their first-term reenlistment point.
A comprehensive explanation of the collected data, along with
a full discussion of the computer model used in the execution
of the research, is presented. An analysis of the results
obtained and the conclusions and recommendations based on
those results completes the study.
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II. THE PLANING PROCESS AND FORCE STRUCTURE
A. DEFENSE BUDGETING PROCESS
The manpower needs of the Marine Corps are derived from
the type of mission that the organization is expected to
perform. The simple reality is that manpower requirements are
constrained by the availability of funds in the budget.
The Defense Department uses a formal process defined
within Department of Defense directives to prepare budget
submissions for the Executive Branch. This process is known
as the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS),
introduced in 1961 by Secretary of Defense, Robert S.
McNamara. The next discussion on how the PPBS works draws
heavily from Foelber's guide called "A Defense Budget Primer."
(Foelber, 1988) Ideally, PPBS works in the following way:
PlanninQ: The Secretary of Defense and his or her staff
along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare a classified
document called the Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance
is the most important document in the entire DoD budget
process, for it provides the rationale and justification for
all DoD programs. (Foelber, 1988) It includes an assessment
of the military threat to the United States national security;
a statement of the national defense policy and strategy; an
outline of the military requirements for defending national
interests; and projected material and financial resources
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needed for defense programs in the future. The Defense
Guidance document is the foundation of the DoD budget process;
the strategic goals and national interests of the United
States should drive the programs and policies needed to attain
those goals and support those interests.
Programming: The Armed Services calculate the number and
type of forces needed to support the military requirements
outlined within the Defense Guidance. Each department (Army,
Navy, and Air Force) submits a detailed list of programs and
projects for a five-year period. The five-year planning
proposals, called Program Objective Memoranda (POM), are then
reviewed by the Defense Resources Board. The Defense
Resources Board makes the final decisions and issues its
Program Decision Memoranda. The approved programs contained
within the Program Decision Memoranda are then organized into
the Five-Year Defense Plan.
Budgeting: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
works closely with the Services throughout the entire process
to ensure that realistic cost projections are used in making
program decisions. The Five-Year Defense Plan is then
submitted to the Secretary of Defense (after OMB reviews and
verifies costing criteria for each program) for signature.
The President and his staff receive the package and they
examine the budget proposal in the context of overall fiscal
policy and administration objectives. Final adjustments are
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made as directed by the President, and the budget proposal is
submitted to Congress for action.
The PPBS process is a slow, deliberate examination of
requirements and resources. The complexity of the process
should not be underestimated by persons outside the decision
matrix. The size and complexity of the DoD structure make it
resistant to abrupt changes; radical shifts in policy or
programs cause imbalances. The rationale that was used in
1961 to provide a five-year defense plan for controlling the
speed and direction of DoD remains valid.
B. CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET PROCESS
The reality of the DoD budget process rests with Congress.
Under the 1974 Budget Act, Congressional action can be
described in four basic steps, This thesis does not debate
the merits of each step or examine each step in detail.
Instead, the steps are presented in the order prescribed by
the 1974 Budget Act along with the formal timetable for their
completion. (Foelber, 1988)
Step 1: The Concurrent Budget Resolution: The Budget
Committees from the House of Representatives and the Senate
commence hearings on the defense budget. The House Budget
Committee reviews the estimates made by the House Armed
Services Committee and Sub-committees, along with inputs from
the House Appropriations Committees and sub-committees. The
House Budget Committee prepares a budget resolution for vote
by the entire House of Representatives. The Senate Budget
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Committee repeats the exact same process in the Senate. The
Senate's resolution is compared to the House's resolution and
the discrepancies are forwarded to a Conference Committee for
debate. Final details are ironed out and together the
Congress passes what is called the Concurrent Budget
Resolution. This entire process should be completed by April
15th.
Step 2: Authorization: Congress approves defense
authorization bills. Authorization Committees define the
scope of programs and authorize maximum funding levels through
the passage of legislation called authorization bills. All
authorization bills should be completed by 30 June, although
no formal deadline is applicable.
Step 3: Appropriations: Appropriations Committees pass
the legislation that authorizes the actual expenditure of
funds. Funds must be appropriated for each program within the
DoD budget. Final date for all appropriations is 30 June.
Step 4: Sequestration: Unacceptably high federal budget
deficits led to the passage of the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Act
in 1985, as amended in 1987. Basically, this Act provides for
automatic spending reductions called sequestration to be
enacted if Congressional spending and revenue legislation
produces a deficit that exceeds the target specified within
the Act. The formula for calculating the automatic spending
cuts is complicated and involves many loopholes. But, if
sequestration is required, half of the outlays come from
10
defense programs and half from domestic programs. The final
date for avoiding sequestration is October 15th.
C. BUDGET TERMS
A few basic budgeting terms should be explained to better
understand the effects of present budget reductions on DoD.
First, the term Budget Authority (BA) represents the amount
of money that can be obligated for the provision of goods and
services. Obligations are incurred by signing contracts,
placing orders, hiring personnel, etc. The actual expenditure
of payments, the transfer of cash, is called Outlays (OL).
The difference between BA and OL is very important. The
nature of most DoD programs entail large amounts of funds.
For example, the BA for a single aircraft could be $20
million. The contract calls for delivery in 3 years. The OL
for the first year is 5 million dollars, 10 million the second
year, and the remaining 5 million in the last year. So, in
this case, the spend-out rate is 3 years. Budget deficits are
calculated using OL not BA. Reductions during any single year
must come from the OL. The largest and quickest reductions
can be realized from programs that have large OL and large
annual spend-out rates. Figure 1 shows that Military
Personnel and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts are the
most significant of these types of programs.
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Figure 1: Percentage Distribution of DoD Outlays by
Category, Fiscal 1989
Source: FY 91 Budget Proposal, Office of Management and
Budget.
D. FORCE STRUCTURE AND OUTLAYS
Figure 2 best shows total defense spending as a percentage
of the Gross National Product (GNP) from 1950 through 1990
(with projections through 1995).
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Figure 2: Defense Outlays as a Share of GNP, Fiscal 1950-
1995
Source: House Budget Committee, Statement of the Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney, Feb 7, 1990.
As seen in Figure 2, Defense spending is clearly on a downward
slide. By 1995, Defense OL as a percentage of GNP will have
reached its lowest level since 1950, right after the de-
mobilization following World War II.
Figure 3, below, provides further evidence of the decline
of total Defense OL, as measured in 1990 dollars. From
Figures 2 and 3 it is clear that, regardless of what
measurement is used to show the changes in Defense OL --
percentage of GNP or real dollars -- the results are
identical. Defense spending is rapidly declining.
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Figure 3: Defense Outlays in Standard 1990 Dollars, Fiscal
1950-1990
Source: House Budget Committee, Statement of the Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney, Feb 7, 1990.
The reality of reduced defense spending along with
understanding the entire budget process reveals the
vulnerability of manpower accounts. There is a positive
correlation between reduced budgets and a decline in total
manpower. (Cheney, Feb 1990) The trend is clear to military
planners as well as budget analysts; the quickest method of
reducing defense outlays is through personnel reductions.
Manpower cuts produce OL reductions.
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E. FORCE REDUCTIONS
PPBS is supposed to incorporate the three phases of
planning, programming, and budgeting systematically to achieve
a comprehensive document that stresses the strategic goals of
the country. However, in reality this is nothing more than
an illusion. The fact is that PPBS no longer treats the three
phases equally. Like many other government institutions, DoD
has become more preoccupied by the budget process. No sooner
is a fiscal year over than the budget "gurus" must begin to
look at the next iteration.
To complicate matters, the Services and DoD are required
to work with projections. DoD starts to work on a budget
about a year before it must be submitted to the Congress.
That puts the projections that DoD has to work with at over
two fiscal years before the budget is actually implemented;
for example, the budget for fiscal 1991 (beginning on 1
October 1990) had to be prepared around October of 1988. The
prepared document relies heavily on forecasting -- a craft
that makes it difficult to plan for unexpected events.
The years 1989 and 1990 experienced several historical
developments that can be classified in the realm of the
unexpected. For example, the decline of the Soviet economy,
the reunification of Germany, the quickened pace of arms
reduction talks with the Soviet Union, the coalition of
countries against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the
subsequent surge of gasoline/oil prices have had a profound
15
impact upon the economy of the U.S. These striking events,
that clearly affect the defense position of the country, were
not considered at the time DoD, the Administration, or
Congress prepared the fiscal 1990 budget, and the events had
very little input in DoD's portion of the current budget.
In the manpower arena, the Marine Corps is also required
to take into consideration inherent characteristics of
manpower systems, such as the effects of policy changes on
steady-state manning levels, the detrimental results of
fluctuations in individual cohorts, and the lags that occur
in the procurement of personnel. All of these characteristics
make the acquisition of manpower a difficult task to predict.
The complications that exist in PPBS reflect themselves in the
manpower arena of the Marine Corps and make the planning
process an intricate guessing game.
Finally, there are the political ramifications and
interventions imposed upon PPBS through Congressional
oversight on defense issues. There has always existed a
degree of Congressional interest in defense matters; however,
that Congressional attention has expanded dramatically in the
last few decades. Figures 4 and 5 graphically support how
Congressional oversight has developed into what some have
labeled as "micro-management." From 1960 to 1985, total
Congressional committee staffs grew by 237 percent and
personal staffs by 175 percent. (Cheney, Jan 1990) Although
some of this growth is a result of the increased number of
16
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Figure 4: Growth in the Number of Staff Members of the Four
Defense Subcommittees on Appropriations, Fiscal
1964-1989
Source: White Paper on DoD and the Congress, Jan 1990.
committees created by the Budget Act of 1974, Figure 4 shows
a major portion of the increase in Defense subcommittee staffs
occurred in the past five years. This growth was not a result
of the formation of new subcommittees, but instead, the growth
is part of an overall pattern of increasing Congressional
control and oversight. And, not surprisingly, Figure 5 shows
that DoD submitted four times the number of reports to
Congress in 1988 than eight years previously. Even the
President of the United States submits one-third more reports
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to Congress. The growth of Congressional committees and their
staffs has placed an increased burden of reporting
requirements on DoD.















Figure 5: Number of Reports Made to Congress, by Cabinet
Agency, Fiscal 1980 and 1988
Source: White Paper on DoD and the Congress, Jan 1990
Within the past year, previous assumptions used for the
determination of American strategy have changed. The U.S.-
Soviet antagonism that in the past has dictated American
foreign and defense policy has decreased if not completely
evaporated. Regardless of the continuing Soviet might, the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact makes the threat of a major
18
battle in the European theater considerably less probable.
These changes call for a reassessment of the needs and
requirements for national security. The Services will likely
be cut in one manner or another; but, the greatest cuts will
probably affect those that in the past were predominately
employed in the theater of operations that is now
disappearing. The Marine Corps, with its expeditionary and
amphibious capabilities, will still receive some cuts, but the
cuts will probably bring the Corps to an end-strength of
approximately 180,000, which is almost equivalent to what it
was before the Reagan expansion years.
The sweeping changes occurring around the world, coupled
with the fiscal and political realities of the country will
require a drawdown of the Marine Corps. The inherent
characteristics of manpower models necessitate that any
changes to the total numbers of the Marine Corps be made by
addressing the present force structure. This means that the
drawdown must be allocated proportionately among the top end
(retirements), the middle section (retention), and the entry-
level base (enlistments). The Marine Corps will be expected
to do more with less personnel. Congress will become
increasingly interested on how the reductions are implemented.
And, at the same time manpower reductions are happening,
readiness must be maintained.
A key to successfully managing a drawdown will center
around the ability of the Marine Corps to identify and retain
19
a strong and versatile, young career force. The manpower
planners at HQMC need a management tool to identify premiere
performers who reach their expiration of service. Once
identified, these high-quality candidates must be actively
"recruited" to reenlist. The first step is to define a
premiere performer by a quantitative measurement of quality.
20
III. MANPOWER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
A. EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF QUALITY
The meaning of "quality", as it pertains to new enlistees
in the American Armed Services, has changed throughout the
years in response to changes in American society as well as
changes in warfare techniques. For example, during the
Revolutionary War, a quality recruit was any "able-bodied
man." Fighting techniques were primitive and unsophisticated.
The emphasis was placed on physical attributes such as stamina
and physical strength. Endurance of extreme physical
hardships and prolonged pain and suffering were earmarks of
winning armies. As society became more sophisticated, so did
the art of warfare. (Eitelberg, Apr 1988, pp. 3-5)
The industrial revolution and the booming advances in
technology had major impacts upon society. Americans quickly
embraced the benefits and labor savings that these new
inventions offered. To sustain and expand this revolution,
business and government leaders realized that the people
making up our workforce would require greater basic skills.
Education and investment in human capital became a priority.
Of course, military applications for some of these great
inventions were not lost on military planners.
World War I (WWI) provided a preview of how the
applications of new inventions could drastically change the
21
way a military force fights a war. Automatic rifles, more
accurate artillery, poisonous gas, and the airplane were only
a portion of the new technologies used. Yet, enlistment
standards for WWI were still crude by present criteria -- an
individual's quality was still measured by physical attributes
-- but assignments within the military were becoming more
sophisticated. (Eitelberg, Apr 1988, p. 11)
America first attempted large-scale screening and mental
testing of recruits during the first World War. The results
of these tests suggest that mental ability was not a strong
indicator of suitability for enlistment. The primary concerns
for enlistments were medical and physical qualifications along
with a rudimentary understanding of the English language.
The important point to remember is that a need for some sort
of screening and classification had become necessary. War was
fast becoming specialized. (Eitelberg, Apr 1988, p. 12)
World War II (WWII) and the conscription procedures
implemented by America would demonstrate the degree to which
advancement in war-fighting techniques had caused a more
specific screening requirement to occur. Specialization,
caused in a large part by technology and industrialization,
demanded skills requiring higher mental aptitudes than
previously needed by the military services. The skill
requirements for WWII were met easily because an all-out
mobilization effort was enacted by Congress. The War was
"popular." Patriotism was a major driving force in meeting
22
the skill needs of the military. Deferments or exemptions
from the draft were minimal.
After the end of WWII in 1945, the personnel requirements
for the Armed Services were cut dramatically. Yet,
technological advances in military weapons -- atomic bombs,
guided missiles, jet aircraft, radar, and communications --
increased skill requirements steadily. A volunteer force
augmented by a draft supplied the minimum number of
"qualified" recruits to meet the needs of the military.
"Quality" was a label assigned to enlistees with higher mental
ability who were capable of learning advanced skills. Dual
standards emerged for enlistees based upon specialty field.
Mental ability, as measured by the use of aptitude tests,
became the primary method for making assignments. The
"quality" recruits were assigned to specialties requiring
skill training, while the ground combat and support jobs were
filled by the remainder of recruits. This dual system of
allocation was used in various forms through the end of the
Vietnam conflict. As sophistication of weapon systems
increased, so did the demand for higher skilled personnel to
operate and maintain them. Congress realized that changes in
manpower procurement and retention were needed to stabilize
the Armed Services. (Nelson, 1986, p. 24)
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B. QUALITY IN THE LL-VOLUNTEER FORCE (AVY)
The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
(Gates Commission) was formed in 1969 to study the feasibility
of ending the draft. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was fully
implemented in 1973. The reliance on volunteers, instead of
conscription, drove changes in recruitment and in the
management of the overall force structure. The issue of
"quality" and the measurement of "quality" were outlined by
the Gates Commission. The quality of recruits, according to
Commission analysts, should be measured by educational
attainment and test scores. (Nelson, 1986, p.25)
The military's enlistment tests have been the subject of
revision and controversy over the past several years. In 1976
a battery of tests called the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was introduced as the Service-wide
enlistment exam. Four subtests of the ASVAB comprise the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). AFQT scores partition
individuals into aptitude categories I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IV,
and V.1 A "quality" enlistee is presently defined as a person
who has scored within AFQT categories I-IIIA and possesses a
high school diploma.
Since 1974, many studies have been conducted to validate
the use of education and enlistment test scores to predict
1 AFQT percentile ranges for each category are as follows:
category I, 93-99, category II, 64-92, category IIIA, 50-63,
category IIIB, 31-49, category IV, 16-30, and category V, 3-15
(ineligible for military enlistment).
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recruit success. It is very important to note that the
Services have concentrated much of their efforts under the AVF
in getting personnel into the front door and through the
initial enlistment contract. Success has been measured by
completion of boot camp (initial training), completion of
formal school training, and the eventual completion of the
initial enlistment contract. Success and "quality" are
treated as synonymous, yet success is performance-oriented,
while "quality" is measured by aptitude characteristics. The
most recent study, conducted by Quester, North, and Kimble
(1990), has supported all the previous studies for predicting
success, including those by Buddin (1984; 1988), Hughes and
May (1986), Marcus and Quester (1984), and Ward and Tan
(1985). Enlistees who have attained a high school diploma
and tested in AFQT categories I-IIIA are the most likely to
succeed. Nelson (1986) summed it up best in defining
"quality" as "attributes the individual brings into military
service rather than performance measures while on military
service." This distinction is significant. Unlike most
civilian businesses, the military force structure is not an
open-market economy. A person must enter the military job
market from an entry-level position. The military force
structure is a closed hierarchy, often called an "internal
labor market." The higher-level positions are filled from
within. In other words, the military "grows" its own leaders.
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To sustain a professional organization, "quality" must be
selected in, and only the best must be allowed to remain.
C. RETENTION IN THE AVF
The AVF has successfully controlled the "inflow" of
personnel who can best succeed in completing their first term
of enlistment. Recruitment techniques and advertising efforts
have been targeted at those individuals who have been labeled
as "quality" eligibles. The pros and cons concerning the use
of education and AFQT scores for enlistment criteria have led
to many spirited debates over the equity issues concerning
economically disadvantaged persons being unable to serve their
country simply because they were unable to pass the entry-
level eligibility requirements. The merits of such arguments
will not be specifically addressed because retention criteria,
not enlistment criteria, are the focus of this paper. But,
we do want to emphasize the fact that the pool of eligibles
for retention is dependent upon the number and "quality" of
those persons who are allowed to enlist and have successfully
completed their first enlistment contract. The standards that
predict success -- a high school diploma and AFQT scores in
category IIIA or above -- also limit participation. America
can have any level of quality in the career force, at least
up to the quality of its population. (Meckling, 1986, p.113)
Retention of personnel past their initial contract has
always been a secondary concern with the AVF. (Roll and
Warner, 1986, p.52) Additionally, retention of first-term
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personnel has been a purely quantitative decision-making
process. Presently, the policies of Headquarters Marine Corps
that address the issues of first-term reenlistment deal
entirely with the problem of maintaining the numbers that
support the current force structure. The Marine Corps, like
the rest of the Armed Services, demands few eligibility
requirements for reenlistment.2  The use of selective
reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) have provided the monetary
incentives to retain those personnel in critical occupational
skills. Cymrot's (1987) studies on the effects of SRB
payments reflected a very strong positive correlation between
raising and lowering SRBs and the subsequent rise or drop in
the number of reenlistments. "Quality" has not been an issue
in establishing reenlistment criteria. The fact that a marine
successfully completed his or her enlistment contract made him
or her eligible and desirable for reenlistment. Reenlistment
incentives such as SRBs, duty-station options, and lateral
move requests were administered on a first-come, first-serve
basis. The Armed Services were confident they were retaining
good people -- men and women who had proven themselves by
performing at a minimum acceptable level. Nevertheless, the
question for the 1990s is whether the Armed Services are
retaining the best people.
2 Chapter 4 of Marine Corps Order P1040.31F, which is the
Career Planning and Development Guide, contains the specific
criteria for reenlistments. Excerpts from chapter 4 are listed in
appendix E.
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D. REALITIES OF THE 19902
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, has outlined the
challenges the AVF will face over the next several years.
Reducing America's budget deficit will require the military
services to reduce their manpower requirements. Force
reductions will occur in accessions, retention, and early
retirements. Mr. Cheney has stated, "We must continue to
recruit and retain high quality personnel." (Cheney, Mar 1990)
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, echoed
the same concerns when he observed that "the Marine Corps is
a manpower intensive organization and remains sensitive to
force structure reduction." "A key issue we face today," Gray
added, "is the maintenance of a quality force." (Gray, 1989)
A restructuring of the Armed Services is inevitable.
Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia, which may involve
as many as 400,000 U.S. troops, will probably not
significantly affect the long-term plan for massive troop
reductions. As Table 1 shows, the fiscal 1991 federal budget
requires troop reductions of 100,000 personnel, although the
Defense Department is authorized to revise those cuts to
80,000. (Maze, 1990) Although the majority of the troop cuts
will occur in the Army and the Air Force, a total of 77,000
personnel, the fiscal 1991 end-strength of the Marine Corps
is set at 193,735 (a reduction of 3,000 from October 1990
levels).
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TABLE 1: PROJECTED PERSONNEL CUTS, BY SERVICE, OCTOBER 1991
AND 1995
Service Oct. 1990 Oct. 1991 Oct. 1995
Army 744,170 702,170 520,000
-42,000 -224,170
Navy 590,500 570,500 501,000
-20,000 -89,500
Marine Corps 196,735 193,735 177,000
-3,000 -19,735
Air Force 545,000 510,000 415,000
-35,000 -130,000
Total 2,076,405 1,976,405 1,613,000
Total Cut -100,000 -463,000
Negative numbers in 1991 and 1995 column are the size
of the cut from the Oct. 1990 authorized strength.
Source: House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
Long-term projections listed in column 3 of Table 1 are more
ominous. By October 1995, the Marine Corps can expect a troop
cut of 19,735 from the present 196,735 force level -- down to
a force level of 177,000. The AVF has demonstrated a
workable system to identify individuals most likely to succeed
on their first enlistment. By adjusting enlistment standards
upward, the number of enlistments could be reduced, the number
of attritions would be reduced , training costs can be
lowered, and assets previously used for training can be
returned to the operating forces. Productivity, narrowly
defined by Marcus and Quester (1984) as the continued
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"presence of the individual," would increase. But, the
standards and policies that control the flow or influx will
also have major effects on continuation flow rates.
The Marine Corps has been using successful completion of
an initial tour as a gauge for future performance in the
service. In the past, the Marine Corps has enlisted
approximately 34,000 recruits a year; of those, nearly one-
third fail to complete their initial tour, and the remaining
two-thirds become the supply market for reenlistments.
(Quester, North, & Kimble, 1990) From this market, HQMC must
procure the marines that will develop into the backbone of the
enlisted career force. HQMC has the difficult task of
selecting the ablest of a group of individuals that make up
this particular supply market. Accumulated information of the
candidate's prior performance is critical to the selection
process.
The Marine Corps' mission of a "force in readiness" will
remain valid. Productivity, which can be defined by the level
of readiness, must be maintained. Preserving readiness in the
face of force reductions, stricter budget constraints, and a
declining labor pool of quality recruits will not be easy.
The Marine Corps must become more efficient in using and
allocating its remaining resources.
Force reductions directed by budget cuts require military
planners to do an "about-face" on how they manage military
personnel. Under the AVF, the driving consideration has
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frequently been maintaining force levels. Ouantity has
sometimes had priority over quality. Today, planners must
reduce force levels while maintaining readiness. Quality must
have priority over quantity. Prospects for recruiting higher-
quality recruits in sufficient numbers are not promising for
the next decade. (Johnston and Packer, 1987) A more logical
and attainable goal is the retention of higher-quality, first-
term enlisted marines. Increasing the quality of the marines
retained will lessen the impact of the anticipated shortages
expected to occur in the recruitment arena; problems that the
Marine Corps must eventually address. Some of these problems
are discussed in the following section.
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IV. MANPOWER: FUTURE TRENDS
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
For the past few years there has been a panic atmosphere
surrounding the predicted shortages in the labor supply of
young, skilled males for America. The nay-sayers have warned
both the public and private sector of a smaller, less-capable
manpower pool in the decade of the 1990s and beyond. (Johnston
and Packer, 1987) As a result, the political and military
authorities have been advised about the impending doom of the
AVF. (Thurman, 1986, p. 32) These predictions even caused
committees within the Congress to start talking about the
possible need for a return to the draft in the early 1980s.
(Kester, 1986) Military planners were aggressively pursuing
various manpower management options when events in Europe
forced yet another set of predictions.
The warming of the cold war with its new political
situation in Eastern Europe has given rise to the cry that
demographic changes may have little or no effect on the
military. The "breakout of peace" served as a catalyst for
the massive proposed troop cuts for all the Armed Forces
beginning in fiscal 1991 through 1995. (Maze, 1990) Eitelberg
(1990) has characterized the future career military labor
market as a "demand" - driven market instead of a "supply" -
controlled one.
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For most of the all-volunteer years, defense manpower
officials have pulled hairs over the problem of
recruiting and retaining highly-qualified personnel -
- holding a constant eye on the 1990s, when the supply
of available youth would bottom out. Of course, no
one suspected that the 1990s would usher in a new era
of defense planning, where more time and w rry would
be devoted to releasing people than to acquiring or
keeping them. (Eitelberg, 1990, p. 24)
It is understandable to see where the two projections for
the future have been able to gather support. But, it is more
important to realize that there is, in fact, a shift in the
demographic patterns of America that will have a significant
effect on both civilian and military labor markets. The Armed
Services will find themselves competing for the scarcer supply
of younger workers with other employers in the public and
private sectors.
Some of the most important areas in which the changes in
the labor supply will affect the military are population
growth, the aging of America, women in the military,
minorities in the labor pool, and immigration. The first
three areas deal with demographic issues internal to the U.S.,
and the last two address external demographic issues.
1. Population Growth
The graph contained in Figure 6 clearly shows that the
fertility rate for American women has been decreasing steadily
since the 1800s. A slow, gradual decline was occurring up to
the 1920s. From the 1920s to the early 1960s, radical shifts
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have occurred. The "baby-boom"'3 that took place at the end of
WWII was only a hiatus in the steady pattern of decline.
There appears to be a leveling of the rates in the beginning
of the 1980s, and future fertility rates in the U.S. are not
predicted to increase. It is expected that the rates will
remain low and may even decline further. (Butz, et al., 1982,
pp. 3-4)
There are several factors that explain the established
fertility pattern. Central among all of them is basic
economics. The "cost" associated with bearing children has
increased significantly. The American family in its search
for a higher standard of living has come to rely on the
incomes of both spouses. The loss of income associated with
dropping out of the labor force to have children, an
opportunity cost, and the added direct cost in child care to
re-enter the labor market are disincentives that tend to
reduce the rate at which families have children. (Butz, et
al., 1982, pp. 6-9)
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Figure 6. U.S. Fertility Rate (Children per Woman), by
Selected Years, 1800 to 1980
Source: Butz, et al., Demographic Challenges in America's
Future, May 1982.
Another important factor is the decrease in child
mortality. Families are now more certain that the children
they have will make it through infancy. Higher survival rates
negate the need for a high birth rate.
Finally, the introduction of effective, easy-to-use
birth control devices has had striking effects. Although
their introduction is not the cause of the decline in birth
rates, it does reflect significant attitudinal changes in the
American family. (Butz, et al., 1982, p.4)
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The importance of this decline in the birth rate on
the supply of labor available for the military is clear. A
reduction in births at any point in time creates a gap in the
supply of qualified military available (QMA) youths. (Johnston
and Packer, 1987, pp. 76-79) If recruiting requirements
remain fixed, a reduction in the QMA makes the competition for
quality recruits much more intensive. To obtain the required
quality personnel for its forces, the military will probably
have to increase wages to outbid the civilian employers.
(Eitelberg, Feb 1988, pp. 14-18) Increased wages, in turn,
could lead to increased defense spending, which is unrealistic
in the face of the 1991 budget deficit reductions.
2. Aging of America
The median age of the general population is expected
to reach 36.5 years by the year 2000. Figure 7 shows that,
by the year 2000, the median age in the U. S. will have
increased nearly 5 years since 1985 and 10 years since 1930.
(Johnston and Packer, 1987, p. 80)
The present decline in birth rates will continue to
push the age profile of the U.S. upward. The steady aging of
the population produces far-reaching effects on the entire
economy. Major shifts in consumer behavior would be expected
to occur. For example, an older population would most likely
prefer goods and services that differ from those preferred by
a younger population. In addition, the need for doctors,
nurses and other health care specialists would be expected to
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increase as more of the population reaches their senior years.
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Figure 7: Median Age of U.S. Population by Selected Years,
1920 to 2000
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Current Population
Reports," Series P-23, No. 138, Table 2-9.
The shifting of age profiles also creates problems in
generating revenues such as income taxes and social security
taxes. (Kettl, 1989, pp. 234-236) Revenues drive the supply
side of the budget process while spending represents the
demand side. A reduction in revenues without a corresponding
reduction in spending results in a deficit. Budget deficits
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have already been established as a justification for a smaller
military force.
This shift in the age profile of the future will
constrain the Armed Services in a couple of ways. First of
all, the demand by the Services and by civilian employers for
high-quality workers, at a time when the labor pool of young
men is shrinking, will drive future entry-wages considerably
higher. (Johnston and Packer, 1987, pp. 81-83) Second, when
the shift in age profile is considered as a contributor of
future fiscal problems, the dollars needed to pay for the
enlarged wages of the increasingly scarce recruits may not be
available to the Defense Department.
3. Women in the Military
The scheduled drawdown of the force may affect the
continued advancement of women into what have been
traditionally "all male" military jobs. However, the
increased rate of participation by women in the labor force
and the persistent public pressures for total equality for
women in all sectors of society will continue to chip at the
traditionally male roles in the military. (Eitelberg, 1990,
p. 24)
It is estimated that women currently make up close to
65 percent of all new job entrants. (Eitelberg, Feb 1988, p.9)
It is expected that, by the year 2000, 47 percent of the
entire workforce will be women, and that 61 percent of all
women will be working. (Johnston and Packer, 1987, p.85) The
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military participation rate for women has also increased in
the recent past, from less than 1.5 percent before 1971 to
over 10 percent in the 1980s. (Nelson, 1986, p. 36) It is
certain that, although great strides have been made with
respect to women in the military, the military participation
rate for women remains well below the comparable participation
rate in the civilian workforce. This area of research
deserves much more investigation; however, the topic is beyond
the scope of this thesis. The important point to make is
that, whatever decisions are reached by the political leaders
of this country concerning the role of women in the military,
the impact on the labor pool will have major repercussions in
the supply of labor for the Armed Forces.
4. Minorities in the Labor Pool
Evidence shows that the racial and ethnic mix of the
country is changing dramatically and will continue to do so
throughout the next several decades. As seen in Table 2, the
percentage growth of minorities in the labor force is expected
to reach close to 29 percent of the net increase in the total
labor force by the year 2000. (Johnston and Packer, 1987, pp.
89-90) What this means is that, of the 25 million new
entrants expected to enter the labor force by the year 2000,
over seven million new workers will be racial or ethnic
minorities. The larger proportion of minorities in the labor
supply represents a larger number of minorities available for
recruitment into the military. Historically, opportunities
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in the civilian labor market have been disproportionately
unavailable to minorities. Johnston and Packer, in their 1987
work, present numerous statistical indices that show the clear
disadvantages that exist between the black and Hispanic
population when contrasted against the white population in the
areas of labor force participation, earnings, and education.
And to those statistics
* . . must be added the extensively analyzed and
debated indications of social disadvantage, such as
poor performance in schools, greater dependence on
welfare, greater incidence of broken families and
children born to unmarried mothers, and higher rates
of criminal arrest. (Johnston and Packer, 1987, p.
90)
TABLE 2: RACIAL OR ETHNIC MINORITIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
WORKING AGE POPULATION, LABOR FORCE, AND GROWTH
OF LABOR FORCE, 1970, 1985, 2000
Minorities as a
Percentage of 1970 1985 2000
Working-Age
Population 10.9 13.6 15.7
Labor Force 11.1 13.1 15.5
Growth of
Labor Force 18.4 29.0
Source: Johnston and Packer, 1987, p. 89, Table 3-5.
Minorities have historically looked to the military for
opportunity, training, and education. In the future more
emphasis may have to be placed on programs designed to provide
basic skills training to entry-level minority recruits who
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come from traditionally disadvantaged backgrounds. (Johnston
and Packer, 1987, pp.89-91)
5. Immigration Patterns of the Future
The racial changes occurring in the labor pool are
being accelerated by the patterns of immigration into the
country. The amendments to the immigration laws in 1965
increased the influx of immigrants from Latin America and
Asia. (Johnston and Packer, 1987, p. 92)
Figure 8 shows that the projected contribution of
immigrant males and females to the growth of the labor force
by the year 2000 will continue to be large.
In contrast, Figure 8 also shows a decrease in the
percentage of job entrants who are native white males, the
group that traditionally has provided the largest
participation base for military service. This change in the
pattern of immigration poses some problems for the Services.
There is some evidence of reduced interest in military careers
on the part of some of the minority groups with the largest
growth rate in the coming decades. (Eitelberg, Apr 1988, pp.
164-168)
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Figure 8: Percentage Distribution of Entrants to the U. S.
Labor Force, by Citizenship Status, and Race, 1985
and 2000 (Projected)
Source: Johnston and Packer, 1987, p.95, Figure 3-7.
Minorities, on the average, also score lower than non-
minorities on the ASVAB. And black and Hispanic minorities,
for example, are expected to experience greater difficulties
obtaining jobs in a market that is likely to demand workers
who are better educated and more skilled. (Johnston and
Packer, 1987, pp. 97-101) These characteristics could
adversely affect the quality of the personnel recruited and




The proposed reductions in military personnel will, in
fact, reduce the need for military labor. The demographic
shifts stated above will affect the type of labor that will
be available. Also, the demand for skills is changing. There
will be a new and more complex set of skills required of the
labor force. As observed by Johnston and Packer in their
book, Workforce 2000,
It is the new jobs and the new workers, however, that
are of greatest interest and concern. The workers who
will join the labor force between now and the year
2000 are not well-matched to the jobs that the economy
is creating. A gap is emerging between the relatively
low education and skills of new workers (many of whom
are disadvantaged) and the advancing skill
requirements of the new economy. (Johnston and Packer,
1987, p. 75)
Between now and the year 2000, even the least-skilled jobs
will require a command of reading, computing, and thinking
that was once necessary only for the professions. (Johnston
and Packer, 1987, p. 75)
The Armed Services must recognize this educational gap and
begin planning a suitable strategy. The military must be able
to compete with the civilian economy for manpower resources.
This competition will lead both military and civilian
businesses to reach into the underemployed segments of the
population. Remedial education programs of some sort may be
necessary to integrate the disadvantaged into the mainstream
workforce. (Lerman and Pouncy, 1988) (Lopez-Valadez, 1989)
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C. MARINE CORPS OPTIONS
Force reductions directed by budget cuts require military
planners to do an "about face" on how they manage military
personnel. Under the AVF, the driving consideration was
maintaining force levels. Quantity has had priority over
quality. Today, planners must reduce force levels while
maintaininQ readiness. There is no option. Quality must have
priority over quantity. Instead of keeping everyone who wants
to stay or providing increased incentives to retain more
personnel, the Marine Corps will be required to limit the
number of people retained past their first-term. Therefore,
a logical and attainable goal is the retention of higher-
quality enlisted marines from the pool of eligibles who have
reached the end of their first-term of enlistment.
As the Armed Services adjust entry standards to fit supply
and demand, retention standards and policies must be adjusted
also. The Marine Corps should focus concern on retaining the
highest quality personnel possible. Future trends in manpower
supply indicate a shortage of young, skilled labor. The
Marine Corps needs a method of identifying premiere performers
and then aiming reenlistment incentives toward those
individuals.
A reenlistee has a documented past history of performance
and adaptability that can be used as a basis for evaluating
individual effectiveness. With accelerated force reductions
driving overall force structure requirements, a method of
44
identifying premiere performers can be a useful tool to ensure
that the Marine Corps retains the best people. The future of
each of the Armed Services and, as a result, the security of
our nation may ultimately rest on the ability to discriminate
between marginal and superior performers. The "quality" of




An objective of this thesis is to provide the Marine Corps
with a management tool that can be used to identify high-
quality candidates for reenlistment. To accomplish that task,
this study uses biographical data on all marines from fiscal
1979 to fiscal 1989. The data were obtained from three
different sources: the Special Cohort Accession and Continuer
File, maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
in Monterey, California; the Master Enlisted Files, maintained
by the manpower branch at HQMC in Washington, D.C.; and the
Marine Corps Historical Files, maintained at Kansas City,
Missouri. These three separate files were merged into one
file.
1. DMDC Files
The Special Cohort Accession and Continuer File
combines accession data from all Military Entrance and
Examination Processing S$t-kions with loss and active files
submitted by each of the Services. The data in these files
are arranged by the fiscal year in which a cohort of
individuals entered the Armed Services. For example, the
cohort for fiscal 1979 includes all individuals who entered
active duty from 1 October 1978 through 31 September 1979.
The use of cohort groups facilitates reconciling manpower
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costs with the fiscal year budget submissions for the
Department of Defense. App-ndix A lists the variables from
the DMDC file that are applicable to each individual record.
Because each cohort splits a normal calendar year, the records
within each cohort represent parts of two different calendar
years.
Our analysis required segregating specific groups of
marines who enlisted in the Marine Corps during a specified
time period. Subsequently, the first step in refining the
data involved isolating active duty enlisted marines with no
prior military service. Seven individual cohort groups,
fiscal 1979 through fiscal 1985, were identified. Table 3
provides a breakdown of the data. Column 1 of Table 3 shows
the number of non-prior service enlisted marines that entered
active duty in a particular fiscal year. The average number
of non-prior service marines enlisted each year during fiscal
1979 to 1985 was 37,566.
To assist in the comparison between cohort groups, the
second step in refining the data involved identifying a
"decision-point."'4 The majority of individuals enlist in the
4 A "decision-point" refers to the time in which a marine
must make a career decision. Marines may select different courses
of action at different times, but if a marine has a four-year
contract he/she cannot delay the decision past the end of a
contract. For our research, extensions of more than six months
are considered a decision-point.
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TABLE 3: NUMBER OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL IN THE COHORT
DATA BASE, FISCAL 1979-1985
Marine Marine Non-Prior
Fiscal Total Non-Prior Service, Four-Year








Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
Marine Corps on a four-year contract.5  Consequently, this
study focuses specifically on persons with four-year
contracts. The last decision-point date for cohort fiscal
1985, with four-year contracts, was 31 September 1989. The
cut-off for data entries available on file was 31 December
1989. In addition, due to the substantial policy differences
governing the selection and retention of men and women
marines, the records of women that enlisted in each group were
excluded from the analysis. Column 2 in Table 3 shows the
5 Other types of contracts range from one to six years, but
the majority of the contracts are for four-year periods.
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number of male non-prior service marines with four-year
contracts that enlisted in each fiscal cohort. The totals
listed in column 2 of Table 3 represent the target group of
individuals used in the analysis. The average number of
marines in the target group, fiscal 1979 through fiscal 1985,
consisted of 26,275 individuals.
Appendix B contains a sample of one of the Statistical
Analysis Systems (SAS) programs used to format and analyze the
data. Each cohort program required slight modifications that
were peculiar to that particular cohort group. The initial
analysis showed that the information contained in the cohorts
representing fiscal 1979, 1980, and 1981 was incomplete. DMDC
is in the process of updating the data base for fiscal 1979
through 1981, but this update would not be completed in time
for our analysis. Lines 19 and 25 of the SAS program require
data for the variable Y6ETSY (Year 6, Year of EAS). This
variable provides the results of each individual's decision
after reaching the "decision-point." Since the data was not
available for cohorts fiscal 1979-1981, those three cohorts
were removed from the analysis. The four cohort groups with
complete data (fiscal 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985) were tracked
through their four-year cycle and the results were used in the
cross tabulation analysis section of this chapter.
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2. Master and Historical Files
The Master Enlisted Files at HQMC and the Historical
Files at Kansas City were used to obtain additional
information relevant to the study. Appendix C contains the
additional variables considered to be performance-based
indicators of quality. The DMDC files were merged with the
HQMC Master and Kansas City Historical Files at DMDC by the
Marine Corps Liaison Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Pfeil. Reese
(1989) developed a similar type of merge in the creation of
the Marine Corps Attrition Inter-Active Database (MCAID) used
for his Non-End of Active Service Attrition study. His
program provides a method for calculating attrition rates for
different recruit types in the Marine Corps. MCAID produces
an accession cohort by merging data from seven input files.
Our prototype program is called the Marine Corps
Retention Inter-Active Database (MCRID), and it identifies
premiere performers for selective retention based upon
specific measures of quality. Defining quality is the
critical element of our research. This thesis examines data
that provide a quantitative account of the personnel who
enlist, attrite,6 reach EAS, and, if eligible, subsequently
either exit the Marine Corps or reenlist for a new term of
service. The prototype model is capable of analyzing an
6 The words "attrite" or "attrites" will be used throughout
this study to mean those individuals who failed to successfully
complete their initial enlistment contract. Although these words
are not contained within a standard dictionary, they are commonly
used within the military.
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entire cohort. Unfortunately, time limits for retaining
proficiency and conduct marks on marines after they leave the
Service restrict the regression analysis to only a portion of
the fiscal 1985 cohort group. Current data base management
policies at Kansas City limit the retention of automated
proficiency and conduct marks to six months after a marine's
EAS date. After six months of a marine's EAS date, the
archives section at Kansas City places the individual's
records on microfiche. This policy prevents a complete
historical analysis.
B. DEFINITION OF QUALITY
1. High School Diploma Graduates and AFQT
The tendency to use criteria that have demonstrated
validity in the past is a compelling one. Successful
completion of an enlistment contract has been shown to be
highly correlated with having completed high school and
attaining an AFQT score of I-IIIA (above the 50 percentile).
This phenomenon has created a self-selection bias within each
cohort group among those persons who reach their EAS date.
For example, if all things remained equal, then approximately
the same percentage of "quality" enlistees and "others" that
first started in each cohort would be represented at the same
EAS date. That is not the case. At any given EAS date there
is a higher percentage of "quality " enlistees than "others".
This is caused by the weeding out effect of military service.
Studies mentioned previously in Chapter III of this thesis
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have shown that individuals with AFQT scores below the 50th
percentile or those who do not have a high school diploma have
higher probabilities of not completing their enlistment
contract. Yet, there has been very little research conducted
to identify who would best perform over a career and, in
addition, whether or not AFQT scores and education had any
affect on career performance.
We suggest that the high school diploma and AFQT score
are only the start, and that the actual performance of each
individual would be the most useful indicator of potential
future service. Studies made by Bowman (1990) and Scribner,
Smith, and Baldwin (1986) that proposed "smarter is better"
in overall productivity were inconclusive in projecting career
potential. Possible explanations for the inconclusive results
include self-selection bias of the study group and
insufficient variation of the measurement criteria. Both
explanations involve questions concerning the validity of
aptitude tests and the biases inherent in performance
evaluation appraisals. With technology increasing the need
for more advanced basic skills, we suggest that educational
indicators, like diplomas and test scores, will remain
important, though not pivotal, factors for a successful career
in the Marine Corps. In the cross tabulation analysis section
of this Chapter, the two variables of quality used for
predicting successful completion of enlistment -- AFQT scores
above the 50th percentile and a high school diploma -- are
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used to detect any "quality loss" occurring at the four-year
decision point. We are not advocating the use of such
criteria to determine reenlistment quality potential.
Instead, by using the same quality criteria for enlistment,
we can examine what has occurred to each individual who
reached EAS.
2. Enlisted Utilization Surveys (EUS)
Marcus and Quester (1984) used surveys of supervisors
to determine the performance of a select group of Navy
enlisted ratings. The authors developed a productivity scale
which ranged from -100 to +100 percent of productivity for
each new trainee as compared to a fully trained 100 percent
"ideal" sailor. According to their thesis, the Navy should
be recouping the investment of time and money spent on each
trainee. The only way to accomplish this is to set a
sufficient contract length that would allow an average
individual to progress along a productivity continuum
(learning curve) that peaks at 100 percent toward the end of
the contract. Maximum productivity potential equates to
completion of formal schooling and reaching EAS.
Although the surveys were biased, to a degree, by the
subjectivity of each supervisor, the concept of quantifying
the technical skill level of an individual based upon a pre-
determined "ideal" level appeared promising. As with any type
of written evaluation procedure, biases of the evaluator,
regional abnormalities and attitudes, and changing
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requirements will induce a significant amount of distortion
that may mask true performance potential of an individual.
Another drawback of concentrating only on technical skill
level, is that the whole individual is not represented.
Socialization and interpersonal skills are equally important
for a successful military career.
The surveys were a beginning toward extending the
research for career "quality". The attempt by Marcus and
Quester to quantify productivity along a discrete measurement
scale represents the start of the research for performance-
based indicators of quality.
3. Performance-Based Criteria
Ward and Tan (1985) examined retention of high-
quality personnel using a combination of the high school
diploma and AFQT score, along with speed of promotion. They
attempted to isolate and interpret what they called a
"quality-loss phenomenon" within the Navy. Their thesis
suggested that retention "quality" should hinge upon
performance-based measures (speed of promotion) and background
data (diplomas and AFQT scores). As stated earlier,
background data consisting of diplomas and AFQT scores cause
a self-selection bias to occur within the study group, but the
idea of selecting performance-based measures from available
data files to calibrate "quality potential" appeared worthy
of continued study. The use of the variable, speed of
promotion, would not be applicable to the Marine Corps due to
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the structure of the promotional system. However, there are
several performance-based measures that would be effective
indicators of quality.
4. Proposed Definition of Quality
We propose combining a type of productivity scale with
other performance-based criteria to determine "quality
potential" for reenlistment. The Marine Corps uses a type of
productivity scale for enlisted personnel in pay grades E-4
and below called Proficiency and Conduct markings. At a
minimum, each marine on active duty receives a set of marks
semi-annually. The marks range from a perfect score of 5.0
to a low of 0.0. The assignment of Proficiency and Conduct
marks is strictly governed by specific instructions contained
in Marine Corps Order P1070.12. This Order is called the
Individual Records Administration Manual (IRAM). Appendix D
contains excerpts from the IRAM that lists the occasions and
prerequisites for the assignment of each mark. The
instructions are explicit. An average marine will receive
markings in the 4.0 - 4.4 range, while meritorious promotion
caliber marines receive marks in the 4.5 - 4.8 range.
Superior performers will have marks above 4.8. A marine's
average-in-service and average-in-grade marks for both
Proficiency and Conduct are maintained in the automated Master
Enlisted Data Files at HQMC while a marine is on active duty.
Other performance-based indicators contained within
the Master Data Files include meritorious promotion records,
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medal awards, formal school attendance, off-duty education,
leadership awards, etc. By combining background data like
diplomas and AFQT scores with past performance indicators, a
broader range of future potential can be assessed. For
example, the ideal marine for reenlistment is one who has
proficiency and conduct marks of 4.6 or higher, or has taken
off-duty education courses above the high school level, or has
received a meritorious promotion for demonstrating the ability
to perform various tasks far beyond the level of his peers.
We suggest that "growth potential" attributes like versatility
and adaptability are strong indicators of suitability and
career success.
Our original research proposal included the use of
formal school class standings and meritorious promotions as
performance-based indicators of quality. Initial discussions
with HQMC and DMDC indicated that those particular variables
could be isolated and merged with the DMDC cohort file.
However, upon further examination of the individual data
elements, the retrieval of those variables was not possible
for our analysis.
Using the data which are available, our model, MCRID,
is based upon the premise that proficiency and conduct
markings indicate an accurate reflection of quality
performance. A marine with average-in-service proficiency and
conduct marks of 4.6 or higher is considered a premiere
performer who has displayed desirable career potential. In
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addition, a marine who receives a personal award of a Navy
Achievement Medal or higher, or improved his or her
educational status at the post-secondary level, or has an AFQT
score above the 50th percentile is considered a high quality
candidate for reenlistment. Our justification for using these
variables as indicators of quality is based upon the
following:
- Personal Awards of a Navy Achievement Medal or higher
require a documented level of performance far above that
expected of an individual's grade or experience. Medal
awards are not routinely given to enlisted marines.
- Self-improvement through off-duty education beyond high
school shows initiative and drive to better one's
ability. By setting priorities and efficiently managing
one's time, a marine who sacrifices off-duty time to
further his or her education shows maturity and
responsibility.
- Lastly, AFQT scores above the 50th percentile have been
used as a standard for quality for enlistment purposes
since the beginning of the AVF. If the entry-level pool
of labor has been filtered by the use of AFQT scores, it
stands to reason the first-term reenlistment pool will
contain a self-selection bias in favor of marines with
AFQT scores above the 50th percentile. Although AFQT
percentiles have been used to predict success during an
individual's first-term, the use of AFQT percentiles as
an indicator of career potential is questionable.
The linear and logistic regression section of this
thesis, which follows the next section on cross tabulation
analysis, contains specific details concerning the
relationship between AFQT and "career potential."
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C. CROSS TABULATION ANALYSIS
1. Analysis
The analysis is conducted on four cohort groups,
fiscal 1982-1985. The nonparametric method of analysis uses
frequency tables to trace the flow of the numbers and the
percentages of marines that fall in three basic categories:
attrition, expiration of service, and reenlistment. Figure
9 illustrates the flow each marine follows throughout his or
her initial enlistment contract. Along the path there are
three general exits where a marine can drop from the system.
For example, the first exit point is attrition prior to EAS.
The next exit is not being eligible for reenlistment. The
last exit is deciding not to reenlist.
Total Enlistment
by Cohort/ ",
Attrites Survivors to EAS
/
Eligible to Ineligible to
Reenlist Reenist
Reenlist EAS
Figure 9: Flow of Marine Corps Personnel through the System
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Within this section of the thesis, variables measuring
quality are based upon previous research showing that marines
with a high school diploma and an AFQT score above the 50th
percentile are more likely to complete their initial
enlistment contract. We are extending the use of those same
parameters to the marines in our study who reach the end of
their initial enlistment contract. In other words, the
analysis is conducted as if quality for reenlistment is based
upon the same criteria applied at enlistment. We are not
suggesting that AFQT scores and diplomas be used as sole
determinants for reenlistment. On the contrary, the reasoning
behind the use of this approach is twofold. First, track
individuals through the enlistment cycle based upon the
initial entry criteria. This provides a complete picture of
what happens to each of the "quality" enlistees. Then
secondly, compare the results of this analysis with the
results contained in the next section which uses performance-
based criteria for quality. A comparison of both analyses
should indicate whether there exists a bridge or relationship
between enlistment criteria and performance.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of each cohort according
to AFQT categories; and Table 5 shows the breakdown of each
cohort by educational achievement. Educational achievement
is divided by high school graduation status: recruits who have
a high school diploma (HSDG), and those who do not (NON-
HSDG).
59
TABLE 4: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-PRIOR
SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR




Year I II IIIA IIIB IV TOTAL
1982
Number 967 7,532 4,871 9,891 827 24,088
Percent 4 31 20 41 4 100
1983
Number 1,042 8,423 5,470 10,656 1,029 26,620
Percent 4 32 20 40 4 100
1984
Number 1,160 8,760 6,345 14,706 1,418 32,389
Percent 4 27 20 45 4 100
1985
Number 648 6,202 5,313 13,032 734 25,929
Percent 3 24 20 50 3 100
TOTAL
Number 3,817 30,917 21,999 48,285 4,008 109,026
Percent 4 28 20 44 4 100
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
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TABLE 5: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-PRIOR
SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR
CONTRACTS, BY EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, FISCAL YEAR
OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT
Fiscal Year HSDG NON-HSDG TOTAL
1982
Number 22,211 1,877 24,088
Percent 92 8 100
1983
Number 25,115 1,505 26,620
Percent 95 5 100
1984
Number 30,913 1,476 32,389
Percent 95 5 100
1985
Number 24,848 1,081 25,929
Percent 96 4 100
TOTAL
Number 103,162 5,864 109,026
Percent 95 5 100
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
NON-HSDG includes recruits who possess any other educational
credential that ranks below a high school diploma. The
results show that during fiscal 1982 through 1985, the Marine
Corps has, on average, managed to enlist nearly 52 percent of
its male non-prior service four-year contract recruits in AFQT
categories I to IIIA -- categories considered high quality.
During the identical period, 95 percent of all recruits
entered the Marine Corps with a high school diploma. The
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results suggest that the Marine Corps is very successful in
recruiting high-quality applicants.
From Table 4, there appears to be one trend emerging
that may require closer monitoring. In the last two fiscal
years, 1984 and 1985, the total numbers of high-quality
recruits have been declining while the numbers of recruits
with AFQT scores below the 50th percentile have been
increasing. In 1985 category IIIB and IV recruits comprised
53 percent of all new entrants.
Over the course of their enlistment, marines may
become dissatisfied with their military career. Unlike the
civilian sector, a person in the Marine Corps has limited
freedom to exercise his or her desires to change profession.
However, the level of dissatisfaction may induce poor job
performance or continuous disciplinary problems. These
outward demonstrations of dissatisfaction may result in the
marine being discharged prior to his or her EAS. As Buddin
(1988) observes:
Attrition is the result of a reassessment by both the
recruit and the service about their initial decision.
Separation will occur if both sides are dissatisfied.
If one party or the other wants to continue, some
compromise may be possible. (Buddin, 1988, p. 12)
Attrition is not always a result of disciplinary
action. There are other reasons, such as medical
unsuitability and academic deficiency, that might result in
the marine failing to complete a contracted term of
enlistment. Table 6 shows a breakdown of the data for each
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fiscal year cohort according to two subpopulations -- the
number of marines who attrite and the number that survive to
their EAS. The findings corroborate the results of previous
studies contained in the literature review: on the average,
approximately one-third of all marine enlistees will fail to
reach their EAS. Attrition is the first point at which a
marine may leave the enlistment cycle.
Table 7 shows the percentage of attritions for each
cohort group by AFQT category. Once again, the results
support the findings of previous research. Attrition rates
increase as aptitude levels decrease. On the average, 71
percent of AFQT category I marines survived to their EAS date
compared with 64 percent of marines in categories IIIB and IV.
In addition, the results contained in Table 8 support studies
that show marines with a high school diploma are less likely
to attrite than those without a high school diploma. The
results show that, on the average, marines with a high school
diploma will attrite at a rate of 31 percent while marines who
have no high school diploma will attrite at a rate of 66
percent.
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TABLE 6: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-PRIOR
SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR
CONTRACTS, BY ATTRITION AND SURVIVAL THROUCH FIRST
TERM, FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
FISCAL YEAR ATTRITES SURVIVORS TOTAL
1982
Number 8,270 15,818 24,088
Percent 34 66 100
1983
Number 8,627 17,993 26,620
Percent 32 68 100
1984
Number 10,500 21,889 32,389
Percent 32 68 100
1985
Number 8,960 16,969 25,929
Percent 35 65 100
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
TABLE 7: PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE
RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR CONTRACTS WHO FAILED TO
COMPLETE A FIRST TERM OF ENLISTMENT, BY AFQT
CATEGORY AND FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
AFOT CATEGORY
Fiscal Year I II IIIA IIIB IV
1982 29 30 34 38 40
1983 30 29 34 34 37
1984 29 30 32 34 34
1985 29 32 34 36 36
TOTAL
1982-85 29 30 33 36 36
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
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TABLE 8: PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE MARINE CORPS
RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR CONTRACTS WHO FAILED TO
COMPLETE A FIRST TERM OF ENLISTMENT, BY
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY,
1982-1985
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL







Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
Of the 5,959 high school dropouts who enlisted during the
period of this study, 3,928 failed to finish their contracts.
Looking at this statistic, it is easy to understand the value
of using a high school diploma as an indicator of success
during the first term. By reducing the chances of marines
failing to reach their EAS, the Marine Corps has reduced
personnel and training costs associated with attrition.
When a marine survives to the expiration of his or her
contract, he or she can, at that point, exit the Marine Corps
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or request to be reenlisted.7 However, the option to reenlist
is not automatic. The individual marine's Commanding Officer
is responsible to determine, based upon established policy
guidelines, whether that individual is eligible for
reenlistment. Appendix E contains a section of the Career
Planning and Development Guide that sets forth the established
policy. Commanding Officers are tasked to evaluate the
marine's "performance" and provide HQMC with a recommendation
for reenlistment. The Commanding Officer's recommendation is
but one of the criteria that a marine must meet to be eligible
for reenlistment.
Yet, there are some marines who survive to their EAS,
but they are not eligible to reenlist. And there are marines
who may have been eligible but decided not to reenlist.
Appendix F contains a listing of reenlistment codes (RECODE)
that are assigned to each of these marines. A RECODE of 'lA',
'lB', or '2A' is given to a person eligible for reenlistment
who exits the Marine Corps. A marine who is not eligible for
reenlistment exits the Marine Corps with one of the other
codes listed in Appendix F. By separating the population of
7 Marines may exercise their option to reenlist up to 12
months prior to their end of active service (EAS). A few SRBs
restrict this option. Marines also may request extensions of up
to 23 months to their present enlistment, usually in conjunction
with fulfilling duty station requirements or reenlistment options
such as SRBs. For the purposes of this study, extensions greater
than six months are treated as reenlistments, since retention
criteria are followed in granting extensions.
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survivors into eligible and not eligible, a more in-depth
analysis can be conducted.
Table 9 shows the breakdown by AFQT category the
percentages of survivors who were ineligible for reenlistment.
Marines who have reached their "decision point" are classified
as eligible or ineligible for reenlistment. The results show
that as aptitude (measured by AFQT category) decreases, the
percentages of ineligible marines increase slightly. In other
words, on the average, 92 percent of category I marines for
fiscal 1982 through 1985 were eligible for reenlistment,
compared with between 86 and 85 percent of marines in
categories IIIB and IV. However, when the comparison is made
between categories IIIA and IIIB, there is no conclusive
evidence of any difference. It appears from the results that,
at the extremes, AFQT scores may affect whether a marine
becomes eligible to reenlist.
Table 10 extends the analysis based on the educational
achievement of the individual marine. From the table there
appears to be some consistency in the percentages of marines
with a high school diploma who are ineligible to reenlist.
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TABLE 9: PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE
RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR CONTRACTS WHO WERE
CLASSIFIED INELIGIBLE FOR REENLISTMENT AT THE END
OF THEIR FIRST TERM OF ENLISTMENT, BY AFQT AND
FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
AFOT CATEGORY
Fiscal Year I II IIIA IIIB IV
1982 11 13 16 17 16
1983 8 11 14 13 15
1984 8 10 13 13 14
1985 7 11 13 15 15
TOTAL
1982-85 8 11 14 14 15
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
TABLE 10: PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE MARINE CORPS
RECRUITS WITH 4-YEAR CONTRACTS WHO WERE CLASSIFIED
INELIGIBLE FOR REENLISTMENT AT THE END OF THEIR
FIRST TERM, BY EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND FISCAL
YEAR OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL







Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
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The results suggest that approximately 87 percent of high
school diploma graduates become eligible for reenlistment.
The findings are less clear when the numbers of marines
without high school diplomas are analyzed.
The column labeled NON-HSDG in Table 10 shows wide
fluctuations in the percentages of ineligible marines from
year to year. These fluctuations can be attributed to several
factors. First, paragraph 4102.3.b of appendix E establishes
the need to have a high school diploma or equivalency
certificate as a prerequisite for reenlistment. The data
contained in the NON-HSDG category includes marines who have
equivalency certificates. Consequently, as the numbers of
marines with equivalency certificates increase, the more
likely the numbers of eligible marines in the NON-HSDG
category will increase. Second, the smaller numbers of non-
high school graduates, that are recruited in the Marine Corps,
cause a larger variation in the percentages with smaller
fluctuations in the raw numbers. In addition, a Commanding
Officer can request a waiver to the high school diploma or
equivalent requirement from HQMC in order to reenlist a
particularly deserving marine.
The reenlistment eligibility criteria established by
HQMC are an attempt at selecting "quality" personnel at their
reenlistment point. Marines who are not eligible to reenlist
exit the system at their EAS. Appropriately, marines who
survive to their EAS and are eligible to reenlist constitute
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the target population in directing retention efforts. Table
11 presents a break-down by AFQT category the percentages of
eligible marines from each cohort who reenlisted in the Marine
Corps. The results suggest that, as aptitude decreases,
marines are more likely to choose reenlistment. On the
average, marines from category IIIA have a reenlistment rate
of 32 percent and marines from category IIIB have a
reenlistment rate of 36 percent. At the extremes, the
differences are much greater -- 31 percent for category I and
40 percent for category IV. The results of previous studies
support the findings contained within this table -- propensity
to reenlist is greater with marines who have AFQT scores below
the 50th percentile.
Table 12 extends the analysis based upon educational
achievement. Marines who were eligible for reenlistment are
examined to determine if the Marine Corps is retaining a
disproportionate share of non-high school graduates. The
findings show that, during fiscal 1982 through 1985, 63
percent of the marines without a high school diploma
reenlisted. On the other hand, only 33 percent of the marines
with high school diplomas chose to reenlist.
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TABLE 11: PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE
RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR CONTRACTS WHO REENLISTED
AFTER THEIR FIRST TERM OF ENLISTMENT, BY AFQT AND
FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
AFOT CATEGORY
Fiscal Year I II IIIA IIIB IV
1982 36 35 38 40 42
1983 30 34 35 38 41
1984 29 30 30 36 40
1985 29 28 28 31 37
TOTAL
1982-85 31 32 32 36 40
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
TABLE 12: PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE
RECRUITS WITH FOUR-YEAR CONTRACTS WHO REENLISTED
AFTER THEIR FIRST TERM OF ENLISTMENT, BY
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY,
1982-1985
EDUCATION LEVEL







Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
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A possible explanation for this behavior deals with available
opportunities in the civilian labor market. Marines with a
higher aptitude would be more likely to exit the Marine Corps
because they would have a higher expectancy for success in the
outside labor market. In any case, it appears that the Marine
Corps may be retaining a disproportionate number of non-high
school graduates.
2. Summary
The results of the cross tabulation analysis for
cohorts fiscal 1982 through 1985 support published reports
that state the Marine Corps is enlisting high-quality
recruits. Approximately 52 percent of the individuals
examined during this study entered the Marine Corps with AFQT
scores above the 50th percentile and 95 percent possessed a
high school diploma. However, there are indications from the
data that a possible trend toward recruiting more individuals
with AFQT scores below the 50th percentile was occurring in
the last two cohort groups -- 1984 and 1985.
Consistent with all previous research conducted on
attrition, our results show that, on the average, one-third
of all enlistees fail to complete their initial enlistment
contract. Of those marines who failed, higher attrition rates
were associated with lower AFQT scores overall; however, at
the dividing point of quality -- between categories IIIA and
IIIB -- there are no differences in attrition rates. Yet, the
highest attrition rates were for non-high school graduates.
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The results showed that 66 percent of all enlistees without
a high school diploma failed to finish their initial contract.
Of those marines who survived to their EAS, the
findings suggest that, as aptitude (measured by AFQT category)
decreases, the percentages of ineligible marines increase.
In contrast, the data show that 87 percent of survivors who
have a high school diploma became eligible to reenlist.
The final analysis on individuals who reenlisted
supports the evidence from previous studies showing that
individuals with lower AFQT scores have a higher propensity
to reenlist than do individuals with higher AFQT scores.
Also, non-high school graduates have a much higher propensity
to reenlist than do high school diploma graduates. These
propensities to reenlist create a quality loss phenomena.
3. Quality Loss Phenomena
Table 13 presents our results in an aggregate form to
show the "quality loss phenomena" that is occurring due to a
natural, self-selection process. In Table 13, each cohort is
divided into three subpopulations -- total marines enlisted,
marines eligible to reenlist, and marines who reenlisted.
Each of the three subpopulations are compared using a quality
indicator -- AFQT category I-IIIA, high-quality, and AFQT
category IIIB-IV, lower-quality.
From the totals contained in Table 13, a pattern
clearly emerges. During fiscal 1982 through 1985, the Marine
Corps enlisted more than 52 percent high-quality recruits.
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TABLE 13: NUMBER & PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-PRIOR
SERVICE MARINE CORPS MALE RECRUITS WITH 4-YEAR
CONTRACTS THAT ENLISTED, BECAME ELIGIBLE, &
REENLISTED AFTER THEIR FIRST TERM OF ENLISTMENT,
BY AFQT CATEGORY & YEAR OF ENTRY, 1982-1985
ELIGIBLE
Fiscal AFQT MARINES MARINES MARINES MARINES WHO
Year and Category ENLISTED ELIGIBLE REENLISTED REENLISTED
1982
CAT I-IIIA 13,370 7,929 2,895
Percent 56 59 57 37
CAT IIIB-IV 10,718 5,478 2,199
Percent 44 41 43 40
1983
CAT I-IIIA 14,935 9,102 3,079
Percent 56 58 55 34
CAT IIIB-IV 11,685 6,646 2,557
Percent 44 42 45 39
1984
CAT I-IIIA 16,265 10,066 2,980
Percent 50 52 47 30
CAT IIIB-IV 16,124 9,227 3,329
Percent 50 48 53 36
1985
CAT I-IIIA 12,163 7,261 2,051
Percent 47 49 47 28
CAT IIIB-IV 13,766 7,454 2,312
Percent 53 51 53 31
TOTAL 1982-85
CAT I-IIIA 56,733 34,358 11,005
Percent 52 54 51 32
CAT TIIB-IV 52,293 28,805 10,397
Percent 48 46 49 36
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
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Of all marines who survived to EAS, 54 percent of those
eligible to reenlist were high-quality. Due to the weeding
out process of military service, the pool of high-quality
potential reenlistees was significantly larger than the pool
of potential lower-quality reenlistees. However, only 51
percent of total reenlistments were high-quality. In
contrast, 46 percent lower-quality marines were eligible to
reenlist, from which 49 percent of all reenlistments were
drawn.
In the absence of any "career quality" indicators,
the data suggest there is a 3-4 percent loss of high-quality
(as measured by AFQT) potential reenlistees. At a minimum,
the percentage of high-quality reenlistees should be equally
proportional to the percentage of high-quality eligible
marines. In other words, if 54 percent of all marines
eligible for reenlistment are high-quality then 54 percent of
all reenlistees should be high-quality. For fiscal 1982
through 1985, a 4-percent loss of high-quality means that
approximately 552 high-quality potential reenlistees were
replaced by 552 lower-quality individuals. A possible
explanation for this irbalance is suggested by the
reenlistment percentages listed in the last column of Table
13. Once again, the data show that lower-quality individuals
have a higher propensity to reenlist (36 percent) than do
high-quality individuals (32 percent).
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It is important to note that the 4-percent loss is
based upon the assumption that the optimal mix of the number
of high-quality and lower-quality reenlistments is equally
proportional to the eligibility percentages. Since the pool
of high-quality, potential reenlistees is significantly
greater than the pool of lower-quality reenlistees, if the
Marine Corps can somehow influence the reenlistment percentage
rate for high-quality individuals -- say raise it to 36
percent and reduce the reenlistment percentages for lower-
quality individuals to 32 percent -- then the Marine Corps can
increase the overall percentage of high-quality individuals
to 58 percent (versus the present 51 percent). With a
reenlistment rate of 36 percent for high-quality personnel
over the same cohort population, the Marine Corps could have
retained 1,364 more high-quality individuals.
Our interpretation of the results is that, if left to
chance, the current reenlistment procedures used by the Marine
Corps favor retention of personnel at the margin. That is,
eligible marines who may not be the best qualified choose to
reenlist over more qualified marines. A method of identifying
high-quality marines in order to target them for retention
above a lower-quality marines is needed.
In the next section, "career quality" is measured by
performance-based indicators. The analysis explores any
possible relationships that may exist between AFQT scores and
the available information on prior performance.
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D. LINEAR AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELING
1. Analysis
The objective of this analysis is to explore
relationships that may exist between performance-based
indicators of quality -- such as proficiency and conduct
marks, awards and educational improvement -- with biographical
measures of quality such as AFQT percentile scores and high
school diplomas. Our intent was to conduct a multiple-stage,
statistical analysis of the entire fiscal 1985 non-prior
service enlisted male cohort. The optimum strategy would be
to compare each subpopulation as it progresses through the
enlistment cycle. Unfortunately, the data were not available
to implement this strategy. That data that were available
limited the analysis to a single subpopulation -- marines who
actually reenlisted. In other words, data base management
policy restrictions at HQMC and Kansas City, Missouri
prevented a complete, detailed analysis. Of the 14,715
individuals eligible to reenlist, the performance data were
available on only 4,052 of the 4,363 individuals who
reenlisted. Thus, a comparison between individuals who choose
to reenlist with individuals who choose to leave the Service
was not possible. Instead, this section is only able to
estimate a linear regression of performance-based indicators
on quality for marines who reenlisted.
But first, the procedures used to format each variable
are described. This is followed by a short discussion on two
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ideal logit regression models. These regressions, which
explore the subpopulations of survivors and marines eligible
to reenlist, are mock-ups that would have been used if the
performance data had been available. The last section
discusses the actual linear regression model that was
estimated, which attempts to find relationships between
performance-based criteria and individual biographical
characteristics. A Chi-square frequency table analysis is
also included.
The following procedures are used to format variables:
- Individual AFQT percentiles are contained within the
input data base. The regression analysis uses the actual
percentile score. But the Chi-square frequency table
analysis uses a grouping of percentile scores according
to a high-quality scale -- AFQT percentiles above 50 --
and a lower-quality scale -- AFQT percentiles below 50.
The variable name is AFQT.
- June 1990 average-in-service proficiency and conduct
marks are reformatted from whole numbers to decimal form.
For example, the marks are contained within the data base
as 45 or 42, but they have been reformatted to 4.5 and
4.2. The regression analysis uses the decimal form of
each mark, while the Chi-square analysis uses a grouping
of proficiency marks based on a quality scale -- 4.6 and
above are high-quality and 4.5 and below are considered
lower-quality. Variable names are PRO and CON.
- A dummy variable named AWARD was constructed to indicate
whether a marine has received an award with precedence
above the Good Conduct Medal. AWARD equals 1 if true, 0
if false.
- A dummy variable named IMPROVE was constructed to
indicate whether a marine increased his educational level
above the high school diploma while on active duty.
IMPROVE equals 1 if true, 0 if false.
After formatting the needed variables, the next step
in the analysis would have been, given the availability of
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the necessary data, to isolate two subpopulations of the
fiscal 1985 cohort. As a reminder, the original population
of non-prior service, male, four-year contract marines
consisted of 25,929 individuals. The two subpopulations of
interest are those marines who survived to their EAS -- 16,969
individuals -- and those marines eligible to reenlist --
14,715 individuals. Each of these subpopulations would have
been analyzed using a logit model with a binary dependent
variable. The logit models would have been estimated using
maximum likelihood procedures. The form of the equations
would have been as follows:
SURVIVORS
y = b + X,(AFQT) + X2 (PRO) + X3 (AWARD) + X4 (IMPROVE) (1)
where y = 1 if a marine is eligible to reenlist
y = 0 if a marine is not eligible to reenlist
ELIGIBLES
y = b + X1 (AFQT) + X2 (PRO) + X3 (AWARD) + X4 (IMPROVE) (2)
where y = 1 if a marine reenlisted
y = 0 if a marine does not reenlist
With a fully operational, interactive data base like the one
we propose, the variables used within the logit regression
equations can be adjusted as circumstances dictate. The
importance of equations (1) and (2) relies on the assumption
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that quality is represented by some measurable and observable
phenomena. Through this proposed analysis, we would hope to
be able to find consistent and reliable relationships on which
to base management decisions.
Regrettably, performance data could be obtained only
on the reenlistment subpopulation. This subpopulation
consists of 4,052 of the 4,363 marines in the fiscal 1985
cohort who reenlisted. The 311 individuals that appear to be
missing can be accounted for in several different ways, but
such a small number is not significant to the outcome of the
analysis. However, it is important to note that information
is incomplete for those marines who were eligible to reenlist,
but exited the Marine Corps. This missing information
prevents a complete analysis and places limits on any
conclusions derived from the data. Regardless of these
shortcomings, the data obtained for the 4,052 marines is
considered to be a representative sample of a typical
reenlistment cohort.
Table 14 contains the results of an initial
correlation analysis of the variables for the 4,052 marines
in the data base. The results show that the only significant
correlation exists between the variables PRO and CON. With
a positive correlation of .825, the findings suggest that a
collinear relationship exists between the two variables.
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TABLE 14: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
AFQT PRO CON AWARD IMPROVE
AFQT 1.00000 0.18957 0.15046 0.06964 0.06699
(.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
PRO 0.18957 1.00000 0.82523 0.13947 0.01102
(.0001) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.4829)
CON 0.15046 0.82532 1.00000 0.08402 0.00018
(.0001) (.0001) (.0000) (.0001) (.9909)
AWARD 0.06964 0.13947 0.08402 1.00000 -.00343
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0000) (.8271)
IMPROVE 0.06699 0.01102 0.00018 -.00343 1.00000
(.0001) (.4829) (.9909) (.8271) (.0000)
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
This finding is not surprising. It is understandable that
marks in proficiency parallel marks in conduct. A test for
collinearity was conducted by regressing CON on PRO. The
results confirmed the suspicion of collinearity. For the
remainder of this study, the variable PRO will be used as the
representative variable for performance marks, and the
variable CON is dropped from the analysis.
The lack of a moderate correlation between the other
variables, especially AFQT and PRO and AFQT and IMPROVE, is
considered surprising. Our hypothesis is that proficiency
marks of 4.6 and above are reliable indicators of superior
performance and that they are positively related to AFQT,
81
AWARD and IMPROVE. But the lack of correlation between those
variables in Table 14 do not support this hypothesis.
A further test of the basic hypothesis is contained
in Table 15. A linear regression equation estimated by using
ordinary least square procedures is used to explore the
possible relationships between proficiency marks and the
variables AFQT and AWARD. The following regression equation
was estimated:
PRO = a + bl(AFQT) + b2 (AWARD) (3)
where a, bi and bI are the parameters to be estimated
The results contained in Table 15 suggest that, although our
model explains a small portion of the variation in proficiency
marks (adjusted R2 = . 05), that the independent influence of
the two variables (AFQT and AWARD) are both positive and
significant. In other words, it appears that performance (as
measured by proficiency marks) of marines who reenlisted in
fiscal 1985 is significantly influenced by AFQT scores and
awards. Another regression equation was run adding IMPROVE
to the model, but the results for that variable were not
significant. Clearly, there are other factors that influence
proficiency marks that our study has missed. With a fully
inter-active data base the analysis could have been extended
to variables that include meritorious promotions, age, marital
status, race, and geography.
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TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
EOUATION: PRO = 4.5 + 0.001(AFQT) +.05(AWARD)
(.0058) (.0001) (.0058)*
* Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; all
coefficients are significant at the .01 level
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE PROB > F
MODEL 2 3.18686912 1.593434 110.949 0.0001
ERROR 4049 58.15099860 0.014361
C TOTAL 4051 61.33786772
ROOT MSE 0.1198408 R-SQUARE 0.0520
DEP MEAN 4.5769 ADJ R-SQ 0.0515
C.V. 2.618383
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
2. Summary
The results contained in Table 16 best summarize the
findings of the overall analysis. Table 16 contains a Chi-
square frequency analysis using quality scales to assess the
influence of AFQT scores (above or below the 50th percentile),
awards, and education on proficiency marks for superior
performers (PRO 4.6 or better) and others (PRO 4.5 or less).
The findings suggest that individuals with lower AFQT scores
are more likely to be low performers, and individuals who have
received awards are more likely to be high performers.
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TABLE 16: CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS
TOTAL OBSERVATIONS: 4,052
PROFICIENCY PROFICIENCY




> or = 50 1,341 569
(52%) (39%)








YES 207 103( 8%) (7%)
NO 2,372 1,370
(92%) (93%)
* SIGNIFICANT CHI-SQUARE AT THE .05 LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT CHI-SQUARE AT THE .01 LEVEL
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
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However, the Chi-square analysis does not suggest what the
magnitude of these relationships is.
The findings of this analysis suggest that there is
only a week relationship, at best, between AFQT scores and
proficiency marks. From these results, it appears that
enlistment criteria for quality have no significant affect on
performance criteria for reenlistment quality. In summary,
AFQT scores may have validity for enlistment purposes, but do
not appear to be useful for predicting career potential.
However, a complete data base is needed for a more detailed
analysis that would provide a firmer conclusion concerning the
effect of AFQT.
3. Quality Loss Phenomena
Using the sole parameter of proficiency marks of 4.6
or above, 2,579 high-quality marines from the fiscal 1985
cohort reenlisted. That total represents 64 percent of the
4,052 individuals examined in this study. That number and
percentage appear to indicate that the Marine Corps is
retaining a higner proportion of marines who are high quality.
But, without having information on the other 10,352 marines
who were eligible to reenlist, but exited the Marine Corps,
any conclusions based on this study should be made cautiously.
The issue of quality-loss based upon proficiency marks is
inconclusive, and certainly warrants further study.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SHORT-TERM IMPLICATIONS
The retention of qualified marines is of major importance
to the Marine Corps leadership. In the future, when all the
Services are asked to perform their duties with less
resources, the accumulation of quality in the professional
enlisted corps may determine whether the Marine Corps
continues to move forward.
The projected cuts in manpower create a need to prevent
an exodus of marines with the highest potential for future
military service. Marines who are desirable candidates for
reenlistment are also the ones who will have a better chance
at finding jobs in the civilian labor market. Higher-quality
marines are more apt to try improving their "fortunes" in the
civilian environment. The Marine Corps must aggressively
attempt to influence marines who are identified as top-
performers to consider the Marine Corps as a career.
In the short run, the Marine Corps should exploit the
imbalance that cuts in end-strength will create over the next
five years. The reductions in end-strength will require a
lowering of needed reenlistment requirements. These
requirements, because of the larger size of the cohorts
recruited before fiscal 1991, will be applied to a
proportionately larger pool of eligible candidates for
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reenlistment. HQMC should take advantage of this opportunity.
By using the performance-based criteria for quality proposed
in Chapter V, HQMC can identify high-quality marines. Once the
group of "quality performers" is identified, individuals
should be targeted and aggressively pursued for retention in
the Service.
B. LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS
The end results of manpower management policies should
provide a force structure that addresses the requirements of
the future. Such a program should include a comprehensive
reduction package that involves cutting accessions, lowering
retention goals, weeding out marginal performers within the
middle grades, and forcing early retirements.
Policies that address the Marine Corps' long-term enlisted
demands should confront the need to build and maintain a
professional enlisted corps that is composed of the highest
possible proportion of "quality" individuals. To achieve this
goal, it is necessary that HQMC be able to identify and target
marines who demonstrate, through performance, a higher degree
of "quality."
Infusing the enlisted career force with quality
individuals will increase its productivity. Productivity,
which ultimately can be defined in the Marine Corps by the
level of readiness of the force, must be maintained in the
face of end-strength reductions, stricter budget constraints,
and a possible declining labor pool of quality recruits. The
87
job of increasing the quality of the enlisted career force
will not be easy; to achieve the desired results, the Marine
Corps must become more efficient in using and allocating its
remaining manpower resources.
Johnston (1986) has suggested that the future of the AVF
may rest in "alert monitoring and responsive management." He
writes:
Management of the force is the key to sustaining the
AVF. We must have flexible options on the shelf to
deal with quantity and quality short falls in
recruiting, as well as in first-term enlistments.
(Johnston, J. D., 1986)
Meckling (1986), however, points out that certain constraints
bound the issue:
We can have any quality of career force we want, at
least up to the quality of the population of the
United States, but higher quality means higher costs.
(Meckling, W. H., 1986)
Manpower planners at HQMC should evaluate the options that
are currently available to deal with the issues of quality of
the career enlisted force. We suggest there is a need to
identify premiere performers before they reach their EAS.
This thesis provides a start toward fulfilling that need.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Proposal for Implementation
Marine Corps policy states three primary career force
objectives. These objectives address: the available inventory
of personnel by grade and MOS, the fairness in promotional
opportunities, and the need for experienced marines at all
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levels of the force. (MCO P1040.31F, 1989: pp. 1-3) In the
past, the Marine Corps has manag3d its human resources by
relying purely on the available "qualified" personnel and the
numbers needed at the time, as determined by personnel
managers at HQMC. The quality of personnel was not a main
consideration for reenlistment policy decisions.
Up to now, the Marine Corps has not used objective,
performance-based criteria to select eligible candidates for
reenlistment. The current policy on reenlistment eligibility
fails to employ performance indicators readily available to
HQMC and the using unit5' commanding officers. To say that
the quality of the candidate is not taken into consideration
is not entirely correct. Decisions that commanding officers
make prior to recommending candidates for reenlistment take
into consideration the past performance of the individual.
The shortcomings lie in the lack of consistent application of
the policy.
Reenlistment incentives are not targeted toward the
most highly qualified marines using an objective set of
performance-based criteria. Under the current system, marines
who reenlist are not necessarily the best qualified, but the
first available.
This "first-availability" concept leads to an
inefficient and inequitable distribution of reenlistment
incentives, such as selective reenlistment bonuses, lateral
moves, and duty-station options. Under the present policies,
89
higher-quality marines are more likely to leave the Marine
Corps. The Marine Corps must tailor incentives toward a more
equitable and efficient targeting system in order to increase
quality and productivity, thus maintaining readiness.
Through selective methods of identifying and retaining
high-quality, first-term enlisted personnel, the Marine Corps
can save money and increase productivity.
With the future cuts in defense spending, the Marine
Corps needs to concentrate more on retaining the best quality
marines from the pool of eligibles. To accomplish this, the
Marine Corps needs to implement a program that uses
performance-based criteria to identify high-quality marines
reaching their end of active service. Once these marines are
identified, HQMC must persuade them to remain in the Marine
Corps. To be able to implement a program similar to the one
suggested in Chapter V, HQMC needs to institute some changes
to the directives used in storing historical data;
specifically, this entails the retention of proficiency and
conduct marks in magnetic data files for longer than six
months after a marine leaves the Service. Presently, the data
are kept in microfiche after the sixth-month mark. Also a
more detailed record keeping system should be implemented.
A system that retains more information concerning performance
indicators such as "meritorious promotions," and "formal
school class standings." The Marine Corps needs to develop
a comprehensive reenlistment inter-active database (MCRID)
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that contains the necessary performance information to conduct
detailed data analysis.
2. Recommended Changes to Reenlistment Incentives
Current reenlistment incentives are misdirected at the
margin. That is, incentives are enticing marines who are
eligible for reenlistment but who may not be the best
qualified. Buddin and Cymrot studied the effects of the SRB
program and found that a SRB cash incentive, based upon
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), would provide the
necessary number of reenlistments. Yet, they did not examine
the quality issue. Meeting reenlistment target goals was the
main driving factor. (Buddin, 1988) (Cymrot, 1987)
Quality must be given priority over quantity. New
policies aimed at retaining high-quality personnel should be
examined. Implementation of these policies could have a
significant effect on the long-term readiness posture of the
Marine Corps. The following are some areas that deserve
consideration:
- The SRB program in the Marine Corps. Presently, SRBs
serve to provide monetary incentives for eligible marines
to reenlist into "short" MOSs. We recommend that the SRB
program be broadened to include selection of "high-
quality" candidates for reenlistment, regardless of MOS.
Considering the scarcity of funds and the criteria being
used to qualify for the program, HQMC should implement a
more efficient system used to disburse the available
monies. SRB dollars should be used equitably and
efficiently to attract high-quality marines to reenlist
in the available billets.
- The Lateral Move program. This program allows eligible
marines from "balanced or over" MOSs to change to a
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"short" MOS as an incentive for reenlistment.8  It also
forces marines who are in "over" MOSs to move into what
may be a less desirable "short" MOS if they want to
reenlist. It is recommended that all efforts of the
lateral move program be directed to retain high-quality,
experienced marines. To this end, the Marine Corps also
should expand the use of multiple MOS training for high-
quality personnel.
- The Duty-Station Option. Our recommendation is that the
needs of the service be carefully examined by HQMC before
disapproving the request for a choice of duty station as
a reenlistment incentive of a high-quality marine.
- The Off-duty Education program. It is recommended that
HQMC establish a new off-duty education policy which can
be provided as an incentive for reenlistment to high-
quality marines. The policy must incorporate a duty-
station option that allows the marine the time and .he
opportunity to benefit from off-duty education.
3. Final Comments
The pool of potential first-term reenlistees contains
the best individuals that the Marine Corps could recruit from
the youth population of four years prior. The quality of this
pool has not been carefully examined in the past. The future,
however, offers an opportunity to explore the first-term
reenlistment "career" decision process in-depth. Further
study in this area promises the potential for increasing the
productivity and readiness of the Marine Corps for decades to
come. The analytical tools to evaluate performance-based
information are available today. It is only the lack of
complete information that prevents immediate implementation
of additional research.
8 A balanced MOS is one that has all the marines, in the
proper pay grades, required to sustain the force structure. Short
and over MOSs reflect a deficiency or a surplus, respectively.
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It is recommended that further research be conducted
in the area of quality as it pertains to the career enlisted
force. The first step in that research requires the review
and implementation of improved data base management policies.
These new policies would permit access to an interactive
source of both historical and current information on
performance-based indicators of individual quality. Only then
will the Marine Corps be able to accurately and carefully
assess the quality factor in retention.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLES USED IN THE SPECIAL COHORT ACCESSION
AND CONTINUER FILE
Variable Label
DOBY Date of Birth, Year
DOBM Date of Birth, Month
DOBD Date of Birth, Day
DOEY Date of Enlistment, Year
DOEM Date of Enlistment, Month
DOED Date of Enlistment, Day




EHYED Highest Year of Education at Entry
AFQT AFQT Percentile Score
MENCAT AFQT Group




EPG Enlistment Pay Grade
DOSY Date of Service, Year
DOSM Date of Service, Month
SETSY Expiration of Term of Service, Year
SETSM Expiration of Term of Service, Month
RECODE Reenlistment Code
SMOS Separation MOS
SBMOS Separation Billet MOS
SPG Separation Pay Grade
SPGY Separation Pay Grade, Year
SPGM Separation Pay Grade, Month
SDOLEY Date of Last Enlistment, Year
SDOLEM Date of Last Enlistment, Month
SHYED Highest Year of. Education at Separation
YlPG Pay Grade, Year 1
YIPGY Pay Grade Year, Year 1
YIPGM Pay Grade Month, Year 1
Y1DOLEY Year 1, Year of Last Enlistment
Y1DOLEM Year 1, Month of Last Enlistment
YIETSY Year 1, Year of EAS
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Variable Label
YIETSM Year 1, Month of EAS
YIPMOS Year 1, Primary MOS
YIBMOS Year 1, Billet MOS
Y1HYED Yl0ar 1, Highest Year of Education
Y2PG Pay Grade, Year 2
Y2PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 2
Y2PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 2
Y2DOLEY Year 2, Year of Last Enlistment
Y2DOLEM Year 2, Month of Last Enlistment
Y2ETSY Year 2, Year of EAS
Y2ETSM Year 2, Month of EAS
Y2PMOS Year 2, Primary MOS
Y2BMOS Year 2, Billet MOS
Y2HYED Year 2, Highest Year of Education
Y3PG Pay Grade, Year 3
Y3PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 3
Y3PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 3
Y3DOLEY Year 3, Year of Last Enlistment
Y3DOLEM Year 3, Month of Last Enlistment
Y3ETSY Year 3, Year of EAS
Y3ETSM Year 3, Month of EAS
Y3PMOS Year 3, Primary MOS
Y3BMOS Year 3, Billet MOS
Y3HYED Year 3, Highest Year of Education
Y4PG Pay Grade, Year 4
Y4PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 4
Y4PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 4
Y4DOLEY Year 4, Year of Last Enlistment
Y4DOLEM Year 4, Month of Last Enlistment
Y4ETSY Year 4, Year of EAS
Y4ETSM Year 4, Month of EAS
Y4PMOS Year 4, Primary MOS
Y4BMOS Year 4, Billet MOS
Y4HYED Year 4, Highest Year of Education
Y5PG Pay Grade, Year 5
Y5PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 5
Y5PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 5
Y5DOLEY Year 5, Year of Last Enlistment
Y5DOLEM Year 5, Month of Last Enlistment
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Variable Label
Y5ETSY Year 5, Year of EAS
YSETSM Year 5, Month of EAS
Y5PMOS Year 5, Primary MOS
Y5BMOS Year 5, Billet MOS
Y5HYED Year 5, Highest Year of Education
Y6PG Pay Grade, Year 6
Y6PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 6
Y6PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 6
Y6DOLEY Year 6, Year of Last Enlistment
Y6DOLEM Year 6, Month of Last Enlistment
Y6ETSY Year 6, Year of EAS
Y6ETSM Year 6, Month of EAS
Y6PMOS Year 6, Primary MOS
Y6BMOS Year 6, Billet MOS
Y6HYED Year 6, Highest Year of Education
Y7PG Pay Grade, Year 7
Y7PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 7
Y7PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 7
Y7DOLEY Year 7, Year of Last Enlistment
Y7DOLEM Year 7, Month of Last Enlistment
Y7ETSY Year 7, Year of EAS
Y7ETSM Year 7, Month of EAS
Y7PMOS Year 7, Primary MOS
Y7BMOS Year 7, Billet MOS
Y7HYED Year 7, Highest Year of Education
Y8PG Pay Grade, Year 8
Y8PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 8
Y8PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 8
Y8DOLEY Year 8, Year of Last Enlistment
Y8DOLEM Year 8, Month nf Last Enlistment
Y8ETSY Year 8, Year of EAS
Y8ETSM Year 8, Month of EAS
Y8PMOS Year 8, Primary MOS
YSBMOS Year 8, Billet MOS
Y8HYED Year 8, Highest Year of Education
Y9PG Pay Grade, Year 9
Y9PGY Pay Grade Year, Year 9
Y9PGM Pay Grade Month, Year 9
Y9DOLEY Year 9, Year of Last Enlistment
Y9DOLEM Year 9, Month of Last Enlistment
Y9ETSY Year 9, Year of EAS
Y9ETSM Year 9, Month of EAS
Y9PMOS Year 9, Primary MOS
Y9BMOS Year 9, Billet MOS
Y9HYED Year 9, Highest Year of Education
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SOFTWARE PROGRAM
//BOISVERT JOB (XXXX,9999), 'BOISVERT' ,CL&ASS=B
//*MAIN SYSTEM=SY2
/1EXEC SAS,REGION=1500K
//WORJK DD UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(CYL, (10,10))




3 IF SEX=2 OR ETOE NE 4 THEN DELETE;
4 IF DOEY=82 THEN OUTPUT;
5 DATA ATT82;
6 SET 14AL82;
7 IF Y4ETSY LT 86 THEN OUTPUT;
8 PROC FREQ;
9 TABLES AFQT;
10 TABLES EHYED * SHYED;
11 DATA SUR82;
12 SET MAL82;
13 IF Y4ETSY GT 86 THEN OUTPUT;
14 PROC FREQ;
15 TABLES AFQT;
16 TABLES EHYED * Y4HYED;
17 DATA REEN82;
18 SET SUR82;
19 IF Y6ETSY CT 87 THEN OUTPUT;
20 PROC FREQ;
21 TABLES AFQT;
22 TABLES EHYED * Y6HYED;
23 DATA EAS82;
*24 SET SUR82;
25 IF Y6ETSY CT 87 THEN DELETE;
26 PROC FREQ;
27 TABLES AFQT;
28 TABLES EHYED * SHYED;
29 DATA INEL82;
30 SET EAS82;
31 IF RECODE = llA' OR RECODE = liB'
OR RECODE = '2A' THEN DELETE;
32 PROC FREQ;
33 TABLES AFQT;




37 IF RECODE = '1A' OR RECODE = 11B'
OR RECODE = '2A' THEN OUTPUT;
38 PROC FREQ;
39 TABLES AFQT;
40 TABLES EHYED * SHYED;
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLES USED WITH THE MASTER AND HISTORICAL FILES
Variable Label
AWl Personal Award 1
AW2 Personal Award 2
AW3 Personal Award 3
SCHI Service School 1
SCH2 Service School 2
SCH3 Service School 3
SCH4 Service School 4
SCH5 Service School 5
SCH6 Service School 6
SCH7 Service School 7
SCH8 Service School 8
SCH9 Service School 9
SCH10 Service School 10
SCHII Service School 11
SCH12 Service School 12
ED85 1985 Educational Level Certificate
ED90 1990 Educational Level Certificate
EDY85 1985 Years of Education
EDY90 1990 Years of Education
JUNPS Jun90 Proficiency Average-in-Service
JUNCS Jun90 Conduct Average-in-Service
JUNPG Jun90 Proficiency Average-in-Grade
JUNCG Jun90 Conduct Average-in-Grade
JUNPE Jun90 Proficiency Average-in-Enlistment
JUNCE Jun90 Conduct Average-in-Enlistment
NOVPS Nov90 Proficiency Average-in-Service
NOVCS Nov90 Conduct Average-in-Service
NOVPG Nov90 Proficiency Average-in-Grade
NOVCG Nov90 Conduct Average-in-Grade
NOVPE Nov90 Proficiency Average-in-Enlistment
NOVCE Nov90 Conduct Average-in-Enlistment
STATUS Active Duty or Discharged
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APPENDIX D
EXCERPTS FROM MCO P1070.12
PROFICIENCY AND CONDUCT MARKS
4008 IRAM
4008. RECORD OF SERVICE (ROS) (COMPUTER-CENERAIED)
1. The ROS is a conrputer-generated page designed to replace the Markings Page, WAVNC 118(23) in the SRO
after completion of recruit training and IST. Retain any NAVMC 118(3) (Rev. 6-62) or earlier versions of
this form which have a combination of chronological information, general military subjects (essential
subjects), and conduct and duty proficiency markings as a standard page for chronological purposes. (See
paragraph 4006.1.) The requirements of paragraph 4007 to prepare and maintain the page 23 on all recruits
and initial skills trainees, undergoing training of 6 weeks or less, does not absolve the recruit depots or
the IST sites of the responsibility to report the conduct and duty proficiency marks by unit diary entry
upon completion of recruit training and IST. Reporting the conduct and duty proficiency markings into the
JUMPS/MHS/REMMPS by unit diary entry provides the data for producing a computer-generated ROS.
2. The ROS provides the commander with a visual reference of conduct and duty proficiency markings previ-
ously reported hor the Marine, and provides averages of those markings for the time in grade, enlistment,
and service. The data reported to support the ROS is used to automatically compute composite scores for
lance corporals aid corporals on active duty. Commencing approximately May 1990, composite scores generated
by JUMPS/MMS wilt appear on the active duty Marine's ROS. In the interim, view the active duty Marine's
current computer-generated composite score on the Video Inquiry System (VIS) remark screen J123. The ROS
prodJced through REMHPS contains special duty bonus points awarded to assist In manually computing a
composite score for promotion of Reserve lance corporals and corporals.
3. Except during recruit training, MCT, arid IS1 (when IS1 is Less than 6 weeks in length), print the ROS
each time conduct and duty proficiency markings are reported and processed in JUMPS/MMS/REMMPS or request an
ROS, when required, if the unit does not have on-line print capability (see the PRIM or RESPRIM). Table 4-4
prescribes the occasions requiring the reporting of conduct and duty proficiency markings. Rules 3 through 6
of table 4-4 pertain to individual TAD only. Participation in the Unit Deployment Program, field exercises,
and other small unit deployments (lAD in excess of 30 days) where unit integrity is maintained does not
require the assigwmenit of conduct and duty proficiency marks. Using the occasion code provided in coltum E
for the respective rules, prepare a unit diary entry as prescribed in the PRIM or RESPRIM.
a. All conduct and duty prof;ciency marks reported in JUMPS/MtS wilt interchange with REMMPS upon a
Marine's release from active duty. Coirmencing approximately October 1990, marks reported in REHMPS will
interchange to JUMPS/MMS upon assignment to active duty and accession of the Marine's record into JUPS/FMS.
b. Upon promotion to sergeant, the "10" date is the day prior to the date of rank. Ulmen the promotion
to sergeant and the semiannual/annual marking period coincide, the promotion markings will take precedence.
Do not report semiannual/annual markings. The reported promotion marks will produce a final average ROS.
4. Except during recruit training MCI, and IS1 (where IST is less than 6 weeks in length), annotate the
marks assigned on any occasion that requires a command to close out and forward the SRS; i.e., transfer,
permanent change of assignment (nee, reassignment), permanent change of station, TAD excess, discharge,
release from active duty, assignment to active duty (EAD, FIS, etc.) and accession into JUMPS/MMS. etc. in
pen/ink on the ROS currently in the SRB. An individual authorized to sign SRB entries wilt authenticate the
annotated marks. If desired, annotate marks on the ROS on occasions other than mentioned above as a
convenience in maintaining a current conduct and duty proficiency record. No authentication is required on
these marks. Do not type entries on the ROS. The unit diary entry supports the recordskeeping requirement,
pending receipt or printing of the next updated ROS. Retain only the latest ROS as a standard page. When a
Marine is prcmoted to sergeant, place the ROS produced as a result of the promotion on the document side of
the SRB for retention until the end of the Marine's current enlistment or 6 years, whichever is later.
5. Verification and Filing Instructions
a. Active Component
(1) Where IS1 exceeds 6 weeks in length, the IST site will print/request an ROS. Upon printing or
receipt of the ROS and verification of the c-,nduct end duty proficiency markings recorded on the page 23 and
entered in JUMPS/MMS, remove and destroy the page 23 and insert the ROS as a stbdard page In the SRB.
(2) Where IST is less than 6 weeks in length, the Marine's first permanent duty station following
recruit training, MCT, and IST wi' print/request an ROS. Upon receipt of the ROS and verification of the
conduct and duty proficiency ma-ks recorded on the page 23 and entered in JUMPS/MMS, remove ard destroy the
page 23 and insert the ROS an a standard page in the SRB.
b. Reserve Ccmponent. For merrbers of the Rready Reserve released from active duty and transferred to
their parent SMCR unit. the joining SMCR unit will print/request an ROS within 30 days of joining. Upon
receipt of the ROS and verification that the conduct and duty proficiency marks reported in JUMPS/MMS have
posted to the Marine's REMMPS file, remove the page 23 as a standard page and file it on the document side
of the SRO for reterntion until erd of enlistment or 6 years, whichever is later. Insert the ROS as a




At The is in a has and do any of The appropriate action is to Ef(ec tive dante
U Marine full duty received the follow~ing report marks by LID entry per is
L upon status, markings condit ions NCO P1080.35, PRIM, or
E whmhospital- within apply? M4CO P1080R.38, RESF'RIM. using
reporting: lied, or the last the occasion codes indicated
a sais- 30 dysin n~ote 4. Certain occasijons
factry withn wihere observation is less
partci- the astthan 3D days do not require
pant in 90 days the reporting of con/pro
an SMR formarks, in such cases the LI)
unit Resrveentry is cmwpleted by
Karines)entering NA in the reqtoired
spaces.
is -e o.. report (SA) con/pro marks on 31 Januaryan
I oprl31 January andi 31 July 31 July
2 an Is yesreport (SA) con/pro works
membr ofof NA
3 o rfonno deprting to IAD report (ID) con/pro marks on the date of
act vedut (ecessof eparuredeper ture
3D days) -
4 17 yesreport (TO) con/pro marks of
"4) A_________ NA on departure
5 L no completing TAD report (IC) con/pro marks mn the date of
excess of departure from IAD site departure from
-3D days) 
-- - - - - AD site
6yes report (IC) con/pro marks of
NA on departure from IAD site
7joined for report (SA) con/pro marks 31 January oal
-transportat ion of NA 31 July
(UA) Status
11-- declared a report (PD) con/pro marks for (PD) marks.
-deserter for period from lost marks the day prior
12 to day preceding UA (..iy be to the date the
(see note 1) NA It less than 3D days). Marine was
Report COD) con mark of 0 reported Io UA
a" pro mark MA (effective on the diary;
date sme as uA date), effective date
for (OD) marks
Is the same as
the I* US date
13--serving sentence report (CD) con/pro imrks the day prior
of court-artitat when ordered to confinement to the date
pursuant to sentence of ordered to
court-martial. No (SA) conf inement
con/pro marks reported





OCCASIONS FOR CONDUCT AND DUTY PROFICIENCY 14ARK(INGS I
I The Is In a has and do any of The appropriate action Is to Effective date
U Marine full duty received the following report marks by UD entry per Is
L upon status, markings conditions PCD P1080.35, PRIm, or
E whom hospital- within apply? NCO PIO8OR.38, RESPRIM, using
reporting: lied, or the lost the occasion codes Indicated
a sails- 30 days? in note 4. Certain occasions
factory (within where observation Is less
partici- the lost than 30 doy do not require
pant In 90 days the reporting of con/pro
an SNCR for marks, In such cases the UO
unt Reserve entry Is completed by
Marines) entering NA In the required
14 is 0 yes .. attending a report (SA) con/pro wmrks 31 Jaujary nd
corporal formal school (see note 2) 31 July
or below which exceeds
and Is a 6 months duration
meNber of & has attended
the USHC for a wininna of
or SMCR on 30 days prior to
active duty regular SA
reporting period
15 attending a report (SC) con/pro marks the date of
formal school (see not- 2) course







16 attending a con/pro marks ore assigned at the date of
formal school the option of the comfmriler. course
which exceeds 6 If option exerci.ed, report compietion If
months duration & (SC) con/pro works on all the commnder
course cofpletion students coupleting the exercises the
is within 30 clays course, option to






18 attending a report (SC) con/pro marks the date of
forml school upon coepletion course




19 attending a report (SC) con/pro wmrks the date of
formal school upon completion of each ech auIcourse








OCCASIUN$ FOR CONDUCT AND DUTY PROFICIENCY MARKINGS i
A 8 C D E F
it the is In a has and do any of the appropriate action Is to Effective date
U Marine full duty received the foltowijg report marks by ILD entry per Is
L upon status, markings conditions MCO Pi080.35, PRIM, or
E whom hospital- within apply? MCO PIOSOR.38, RESPRIM, using
reporting: ited. or the lost the occasion codes Indicated
a satis- 30 days? in note 4. Certain occasions
factory (within where observation is less
prticO- the lost than 30 days do not require
pant in 90 days the reporting of con/pro
an SMCR for marks, in such cases the IU)
unit? Reserve entry Is completed by
Marines) entering KA In the required
spces.
20 Is a yes released from report (IR) con/pro marks or the date of
corporal EAD I AD7 if in conjunction with trantfer (Ti);
or below completion of formal school date of course
and is a report (SC) completion (SC)
- meber of
21 the USMC released from report (TR) con/pro marks the date
or SMCR on active duty released from




22 transferred upon report (1R) con/pro marks the date of
ccmplet ion of transfer
recruit training
23 transferred upon reporting of con/pro marks not applicable
cro pletion of MCI is not required
transferred upon report (TA) con/pro marks the date of
completion of IS transfer
25 --- transferred but: report (IR) con/pro marks





- member of flog
staff allowance
when flog shifts
26 discharged prior report (DC) con/pro marks the date of
to completion of of WA discharge
recruit training
27 is a no .... report (AN) marks on 31 December
corporal 31 December
or below (see note 3)
28 arid a yes report (AN) marks of *A
me ber of on 31 December
the S14CR
29 not on transferred and report (IP) con/pro marks the date of






OCCASIONS FOR CONDUCT AND DUTY PoRICIENCY MA RKINGS ]
A 6 C O E F
R The is in a has end do any of The appropriate action I% to Effective date
U Narlne full duty received the following report marks by UI entry pwr is
L upon status, markings conditions NCO P1080.35, PRIM, or
E whom hospital- within apply? NCO PIO8OR.38, RESPIm. Uefln
reporting- lzed, or the lost the occasion codes indicated
a satis- 30 daysl in note 4. Certain occasi ns
factory (within where observation i% lets
partici- the last than 30 days do not require
pant in 90 day% the reporting of con/pro
an SMCR for marks, in such cas_.s the tL0
unit? Reserve entry is coWteted by
Marines) entering NA in the reqtired
spoc es.
30 Is a --- transferred and report OR) cm/pro mrks the date of
corpora( has not completed of NA transfer
or below 6 10T periods
and a
31 meqber of assigr ent to report (Ti) con/pro marks the day prior
the SMCR active duty (EAO, to the dpte of
not on FTS. etc,) assigrment to
active duty active duty
32 no assigned to report (1) Con/pro mrks
involuntary
active duty
33 --- capletin AT report (At) Cori/pro marks the date
(see note 3) training Is
34 completing cotpleted
alternate AT
35 change of primary report (CD) con/pro marks the day prior
duty - Reserve of NA to the
mobilization effective date
of the change
36 transferred upon report (1R) con/pro marks the date of
Reserve of NA trns-fer
mobit isat ion
37 is a promoted to report (PR) con/pro marks the day prior
corporal sergeant to the date of
or below rank
and is a
38 eemier of reduced report (RD) con/pro warks the day prior
the USMC to date of
or S04CR reduction
regardless
39 of active reduced (results report (RD) con/pro marks of the day prior
duty $tatus of court-martial) NA if previously reported as to the




40 restoration of delete (10) con/pro mrks not applicable
grade from and report restoration of





OCCASIONS FOR CONDUCT AND DUTY PROFICIENCY MARKINGS
A 9 C D E IF
R The is in a has and do any of the appropriate action is to Effective date
U Marine full duty received the following report marks by UD entry per is
L upon status, markings conditions NCO P1080.35, PRIM, or
E whom hospital- within apply? MCO P1O8OR.38, IIESPRIN. using
reporting: ized, or the last the occasion codes indicated
a satis- 30 days? in note 4. Certain occasions
factory (within where observation is less
partici- the last that) 30 days do not require
pant in 90 days the reporting of con/pro
an SMCR for marks, in such cases the LID
unit? Reserve entry is completed by
Marines) entering NA in the required
spaces.
41 is a --- change of primary report (CO) con/pro marks - the day prior
corporal duty for 30 days commander has option to mark to the
or below or more for shorter periods effective date
and a of the change
metrber of
42 the USmC broken/cont inuous report (RE) con/pro marks as applicable
or SMCR reenlistment or
rejardl-ss when no marks
of active exist to compute
duty status a composite score
for promotion
43 yes has been joined report (SA) or (AN) con/pro 3) January and
- for less than marks of NA 31 July for
44 no 30 days (90 days active duty
for SMCR) 31 December
for SMrR
45 --- transferred to report (0)0 con/pro marks the date of
TDRL transfer
46 no transferred report (TR) con/pro marks
-- (see note 5)
47 yes report (IR) con/pro marks
of NA
48 discharged report (DC) con/pro marks the date of
discharge
NOTE 1: Do not remove the co¢wluct mark of "0" resulting from declaration of desertion %here the Marine is
tried for desertion and is convicted of either desertion or the lesser included offense of UA.
tried and convicted of UA, or received NJP for UA. Delete a conduct mark of "0" resulting from
declaration of desertion if the entry was ade as the result of an adhinistrative error; I.e.. the
entry shojld not have been made originally, or if the Marine Is later acquitted by court-martial of
the absence which caused the declaration of desertion. 1he entry Is deleted as erroneous in
JUMPS/M4S per MCO P1080.35, PRIM. When the conduct mark of "0" is ramoved as erroneous, the "tO"
markings remain. Report subsequent conduct a"d duty proficiency marks on the occasions stipulated.
NOTE 2: Marines In this category will receive two sets of marks (SA and SC) for formal school attendance.
NOTE 3: If the Marine attends arnual tralhing within 90 days of the effective date for reporting annual
marks, report AN marks. If the Marine receives mrks for any other occasion within 90 days of the
effective date for reporting annual marks, report AN marks of NA. If the effective date for annual




NOTE 4: Ue the following occasion Codes when reporting conduct and duty proficiency Arking% Into the
JuirS/IMS and REHMPS. Use these occasion codes for recruits and certain initial skills traineeq to




Assignment to Active Duty (Reserve)
Assigrment to Involuntary Active Duty (Reserve)
Release from Active Duty
Release from [AD, ITS. etc. (Reserve)
Completion of Initial Skill Training
Completion of recruit training
Temporary Disability Retired List (TORL) DL DL
Discharge DC DC
Promotion to Sergeant PR I'e
Reduct ion RD RD
Declared Deserter (first day of UA period) DD
Last Ony Prior to Declaring Deserter PO ""
To tAD ID --
TAD Corripete IC
Change of Primary Duty CD CD
Service School Completion SC SC
Semi anrun I SA -
Arvvwa I - - AN
Completion of Arrxim Training -- AT
Recommndck, (See MCD P1400.32.) RE RE
NOtE 5: If the effective date for YR marks coincides with the requirement to report S4 marks the IR mrks wilt
take precedence.
5. Corduct Markings
a. In addition to observance of the letter of law and regulations, conduct includes conformance to
accepted usage and custom and positive contributions to unit and Corps. General bearing, attitude,
interest, reliability, courtesy. cooperation, obedience. adnptability, Influence on others, moral fitness,
physical fitness as effected by clean and temperate habits, naol participation in unit activities not related
directly to unit mission are all factors of coruct and should be considered in evaluating the Marin., the
mark assigned, after consideration of these qualities and, if necessary, consultotlon with the officer or
senior noncommnissioned officer who supervise- the Marine's performance of duty, should represent a fair
objective evaluation of the Marine's conduct for the marking period, failure to make satisfactory progress
while assigned to a weight control or military apoenrance program is one other factor which should be cn-
sidered when assigning conduct marks.
b. In addition to the standards listed in the table below, the following gneral guidance *irples to
the essigrnent of conduct marks to Marines upon successful completion of recruit training:
(I) Generally, a recruit will receive a conduct mark in the 4.0 - 4.4 range. As an example. an
average recruit would receive a conduct mark of 4.2. A recruit receiving nonjudicial puI ishment (NJ) will
normally be assigrd a conkct mark below 4.0.
(2) Recruits who receive a meritorious promotion, or are of meritorious promotion caliber for their
efforts in recruit training, will receive a conduct mark In the 4.S - 4.8 rarge.
(3) A recruit who was selected as a platoon or series honor graduate will receive a conduct mark in
the 4.9 - 5.0 range.
c. Use the following general guidance and standards In assigning conduct marks; howver, full
discretion is left to commanders In assigning marks outside these standards for good and sufficient reasons.
Base assignment of marks subsequent to the assigrnment of reduction marks for a pIuniltive reduction upon the
Marine's conduct in the current grale. Do not consider the NJP that awarded the reduction during a
subsequent marking period. Document the assigment of a conduct mark below 4.0 for any reason other than





M4ARK ADJECTIVE STANDARD'S OF CONDUCT
RAT ING
0 Unsatisfactory Habituel offender.
to Conviction by general, special, or mr're then one suirriwry court-muartial.
11.9 Give a mark of "0" upion declaration of desertion.
- Ordered to confinement pursuanit to sentence of court-martial.
Two or more puniitive reductions In grade.
2 Poor No specilt court-martial.
to Not more than one surwirry court-martilt.
2.9 Not wore than two nonjudicial punishments.
Punitive reduction in grade.
3 ;air No cou~t-martist.
to Not wore than one nonjudicial punishssont.
3.9 No unfavorable impressions of the qualities listed In pnrogra-r 4008.S.
Failure to m.ric satisfactory progrecit while scritiryr'r to the w'iglit conttol
or military arpprarance program.
Conduct such as not to impair appreciably one's usefulness or the
efficiency of the commarnd, but conduct not sufficient to merit on
honorabte discharge.
4 Good No offenses.
to No unfavorable Impressions as to attitude, interests, congeration,
1. oeience, after-effects of Intear-'erance. courtesy arid consideration,
and observance of regulations.
4.5 Excellent No offenses.
to Positive favorable impressions of the cqualities listed in
4.8 paragraph 4008.s. Demnonstrated reliability, good influence, sobriety.
obedience, and industry.
4.9 Outstanding No offenses.
to Exhibits to an outstanding degree the qualities listed In
5 paragraph 4008.5a. Observes spirit as well as letter of orders enid
regulations. Demonstrated positive effect on others by exaMle and
persusion.
6. Duty Proficiency Marks
a. In assigning duty proficiency marks, use a scale of zero to five. The maik should indicate how well
a Marine performed the primary dluty during the marking period, in addition to technical skills arnd
specialized knowledge, qualities such as leadership arnd physical fitness should be considered when they he
a definite relation to the primary duty assicirrient. Leadership, for example, should be constclered when
evaluating a squad leader's; performance of duty; or, for a Marine asstignec to recruiting duties, tact,
persuasiveness, and personal appearance would hive a definite bearing on the performance of those primary
duties. Due allowance should be made when a Marine Is filling a billet Inconsistent with the grade. The
corernarvler should consult with the off icer or senior noncommissioned officer who* supervises the Marine's
performance of duity prior to assigning duty proficiency works.
& b. In addition to the standards listed in the table below, the following guidance aMiles to aesigruwe t
of duty proficiency mark% to Marines upon successful complet ion of recruit training based on a level of
performance achieved in the areas of marksmanship. water survival, close order dill, physical fitness,
academic tests, an-d inspections.
(1) The majority of duty proficiency marks wilt be In the 4.0 -4.4 range. As an eample. an
average recruit would receive a dluty proficiency mark of 4.?.
(2) Recruits who receive a meritorious pr-omotion, or are of meritorious proumotion caliber for
efforts In recruit training, will receive a duty proficiency mark In the 4.5 - 4.6 range.
(3) A recruit who is selected as a platoon or series honor gradunte will receive a duty proficiency
mark in the 4.9 - 5.0 range.
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c. Use the following guidance and standards in assigning duty proficiency marks; however, full discre-
tion is left to cornianders in assigning marks outside these stondards for good and sufficient reasons.
Document a duty proficiency mark below 3.0 by a brief page 11 entry.
CORRESPONDING
MARK ADJECTIVE STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
RATING9
0 Unsatisfactory Does uracceptable work in mst of duties, generally urdependable; needs
to considerable assistance and close supervision on even the simplest
1.9 assignment.
2 Poor Does acceptable work in some of duties but cannot be depended upon.
to Needs assistance and close supervision on all but the simplest
2.9 ass ignments.
3 Fair Handles routine matters acceptably bujt needs close st4iervision when
to performing duties not of a routine nature.
3.9
4 Good Can be depended upon to discharge regular duties thoroughly arid
to competently but usually needs assistance in dealing with problems not
4.4 of a routine nature.
4.5 Excellent Does excellent work In all regular duties, but needs assistance in
to dealing with extremely difficult or unusual assignroents.
/,.8
4.9 Outstanding Does superior work in all duties. Even extremely difficult or uusuat
to assignments can be given with full confidence that they will be handled
5 in a thoroughly co" tent marner.
4009. RECM, OF TIME LOST, PROMOION, REDUCTIOn. PROOTION STATUS ON TRANSFER (NAVMC Ila(_) (REV. 6-85),
1. Upon receipt of this revision, remove and transfer the page 5 to the dciumwnt side of the service record
for vieff.ers of the Regular Establishment. Information previously contained on the page 5 for sergeants and
below is now resident in the Marine's jumrS/NMS computer record. Assess dots by using the following Video
Inquiry System (VIS) remark screens:
a. Time Lost - J905.
b. Historical Promotion Date - J702.
r. Computer-generated Composite Score - J123. Commencing approximately May 1990, cofosite scores
generated by JUHPS/WIS will appear on the Marine's ROS.
Contirnue to mintain page 5 as a standard page for all sergeants and below of the Ready Reserve only.
The puge 5 will remain a standard page for the Ready Reserve during periods of active duty, I.e., 15
Program, EAD, etc.
2. Maintain page 5 for monbers of the Ready Reserve as follows:
a. Upon promotion to the grade of staff sergeant, transfer the page 5 to the document side of the gS
for permanent retention. the promotion entry to staff sergeant is not required prior to transfer of the
page S. In cases where a iubsequent reduction Is below the grade of staff sergeant, return Wd maintain the
page S ot the standard side of the SRO. In all cases where periods of lime lost are entered, page 5 will
remain on or be returned to the standard side of the SIR regardless of grade.
b. Wen the systems-generated page 5 Is opened at the recruit depot, the rectangle at tite top of the
page marked "PEOD" will contain the Marine's PEOD which Is resident In the JUHr'S/llS data base. this date
need no be modified due to periods of time lost. if a subsequent a"dit of records reveals the date to be
Incorrect, take corrective action per 04CO P1080.35, PIM or M1CO PIOOR.38, IRESr'RIM, as pprnf r isle, "nd
delete the dale by drawing a thini-inked line through the entry. No further entries are required. If a




EXCERPTS FROM NCO P1040.31
REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
CAREER PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT GUIDE 4102
4102.7 and 4200) will be reenlisted or extended without prior approval of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMEA-6), for the minimum time necessary to comply with
obligated service requirements of the appropriate directive or paragraph of this
Manual. This authority includes early reenlistment, however, it does not include
early reenlistment simply to allow a Marine in a bonus eligible MOS to retain
eligibility.
4102. REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
I. General. Commanders should exercise caution in considering applications for
reenlistment to ensure that other administrative criteria affecting a Marine's
reenlistment situation are considered prior to authorizing further service. Some of
these are: computation of lost time, promotion status, grade at time of reenlistment,
service limitations, and reenlistment Incentives. Counsel Marines thoroughly on
reenlistment prerequisites. Reenlistment prerequisites which may be waived by
commanding generals for first-term reenlistees are so indicated. Waiver(s) of other
eligibility prerequisites must be obtained from the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Paragraph 4103 discusses in detail policies and procedures for consideration of a
Marine's case for waiver of reenlistment prerequisites.
2. Basic Reenlistment Prerequisites. The following basic reenlistment prerequisites
pertain to all Marines applying for reenlistment. The Marine's case must satisfy
these prerequisites prior to effecting reenlistment.
a. Be recommended by the commanding officer.
b. Must have demonstrated the high standards of leadership, professional
competence, and personal behavior required to maintain the prestige and quality
standards of the Marine Corps.
c. Possess the moral character and personal integrity expected of all Marines.
d. Pass a physical examination to be fully qualified for all duties at sea and in
the field within 6 months prior to immediate reenlistment as provided in Manual of the
Medical Department, chapter 15, paragraphs 15-56(1) and 15-91(1)(b). Additionally,
the Marine must meet dental standard class I or II as prescribed in chapter 6, Manual
of the Medical Department. Provided the Marine is otherwise qualified for
reenlistment, an extension may be requested for sufficient time to obtain treatment to
meet the prescribed dental standards.
e. Pass the physical fitness test per MCO 6100.3, and meet military appearance
and height/weight standards prescribed by MCO 6100.10.
f. Not have an incident involving confirmed illegal use, possession, or
distributioi, of a controlled substance. This does not include information obtained
while a Marine is volunteering for the Marine Corps drug exemption program per
paragraph 2202 of MCO P5300.12. Waivers for distribution/trafficing will not be
granted. Waivers for use or possession of user amounts, exoept for first term
Marines may be submitted for consideration to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(MMEA-61. Commanding generals may grant waivers to first-term Marines for use or
possession of user amounts provided the Marine was retained on active duty as a result
of having potential for continued military service. Such waivers should only be
granted if the following criteria are met:
(1) The first-term Marine's overall conduct/performance record justifies
waiver action.
(2) Command monitoring/USP (MCO P5300.12) observation over a period of 6
months has revealed no further drug involvement.
(3) For involvement after I February 1982, a local Level I educational program
must have been successfully completed.
(4) Extensions may be requested to allow individual Marines the opportunity to
meet these waiver criteria.
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g. Not be a conscientious objector and have never received clemency under the
President's Clemency Program (Executive Order No. 11803 of 16 September 1974).
h. Not be a sole surviving son/daughter. However, Marines may waive this status
per MCO 1300.8.
1. Have no known dependency or hardship that Is not temporary in nature and that
causes the Marine to be nondeployable or not available for worldwide assignment at any
time.
J. Marines who are single parents having custody of their children or
dual-service couple with children are required to comply with MCO 1740.13, which
provides guidelines on measures to be taken to ensure childcare in the event of
deployment or unrestricted tour.
k. Not be under a Commandant of the Marine Corps imposed reenlistment
restriction. (The commanding general may waive for first-term Marines provided the
reason for restriction is obtained from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (RMEA-6)).
1. Have no convictions by a court-martial. (The commanding general may waive for
first-term Marines.)
m. Have no known convictions by civil authorities (foreign or domestic), or
action taken which is tantamount to a finding of guilty of an offense for which the
maximum penalty under the UCMJ is confinement for 6 months or more and/or a fine of
$500 or more. Only consider convictions which occurred during the period of
enlistment/reenlistment unless a prior conviction was unknown/not listed at the time
of enlistment/reenlistment. If the offense is not listed in the Manual for Courts
Martial Table of Maximum Punishments, or is not closely related to an offense listed
therein, the maximum punishment authorized by the U.S. Code, or the District of
Columbia Code, whichever is lesser, applies. (The commanding general may waive for
first-term Marines.) Waivers of conviction for distribution or possession with intent
to distribute of narcotics or dangerous drugs (including marijuana) will not be
granted. Waivers for use or possession of user amounts are subject to the conditions
described in paragraph 4102.2f above.
n. Have no more than two nonjudicial punishments. (The commanding general may
waive for first-term Marines.)
o. Have a minimum conduct and duty proficiency mark average of 4.0/4.0,
respectively, during the current enlistment and extensions thereto. (The commanding
general may waive for first-term Marines. This does not apply to sergeants and
above.)
p. Not have completed a level II or III alcohol treatment program, per MCO
P5300.12, during the past 12 months. In these cases, Marines may request an extension
for up to 12-months to allow them to complete their aftercare treatment program and to
allow the command to observe their performance and conduct. The 12-month period
begins on the date the Marine successfully completes level II or level III treatment.
Career planners must confirm completion by contacting the command drug and alcohol
Level II facility.
q. Complete an unscheduled urinalysis within 90 days prior to reenlistment.
Third term and later reenlistees are excluded.
3. Prerequisites for First Reenlistment. In addition to those basic reenlistment
prerequisites in paragraph 4102.2 above, Marines serving on their Initial enlistments,
including extensione of enlistment thereto, must meet the following prerequisites
prior to reenlistment:
a. Time In Service Criteria. Providing the requested/authorized reenlistment
term provides a minimum of 2 years service beyond the term of current enlistment and
extensions of enlistment thereto, Marines are eligible to reenlist:
(1) Who have an initial enlistment term of 2 years and who complete a minimum
21 months of continuous active duty in the Regular Marine Corps.
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(2) Who have an initial enlistment term of 3 or more years and who have 1 year
or less remaining on the current enlistment, and extensions of enlistment thereto.
b. Be a high school graduate or alternative credential holder. (The commanding
general may waive.)
c. Have the general technical (GT) composite score of 80 for a high school
graduate or alternative credential holder or 95 for a nonhigh school graduate. (The
commanding general may waive.)
4. Prerequisites for Second and Later Reenlistment. Marines who have previously
reenlisted must meet all the basic reenlistment prerequisites in paragraph 4102.2
above (applicable to current enlistment only). Any disqualifying factor for which the
Marine was previously granted a reenlistment waiver by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps will not in itself be a bar to reenlistment. However, such disqualifying
factors will be considered in evaluating the whole Marine.
a. Additionally, Marines who have previously reenlisted must meet the following
prerequisites: Have I year or less remaining on the current enlistment and extensions
of enlistment thereto and reenlist for a term which will result in a minimum 2-year
service obligation beyond the current contract and extensions of enlistment thereto.
b. Marines reenlisting for the second or later time must be a high school
graduate or alternative credential holder. Waiver authority in this case resides with
the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
5. Forwarding Request. Commanding officers are not required to forward the request
of a first- or second-term Marine who is not recommended for reenlistment provided theMarine has been in the unit at least 12 months. If a third or later term Marine who
is eligible desires additional service, but is not recommended for reenlistment, the
request must still be referred to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMEA-6). Final
reenlistment authority in this case resides with the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(MMEA). Reenlistment authority granted by the Commandant of the Marine Corps remains
effective until the Marine's expiration of enlistment, and extensions thereto, or
until the date specified in the approval.
6. Obligated Service Requirements for Transfer/Training. Exceptions will be made by
the Commandant of the Marine Corps to allow Marines to reenlist earlier than I year to
EAS to meet needs of the service. Marines in receipt of permanent change of
station orders requiring additional obligated service may request this exception.
This includes orders to Drill Instructor, Recruiter, and Marine Security Guard
Schools.
7. Two-Year Reenlistments. Marines reenlisting for a period of 2 years must do so at
EAS.
4103. WAIVER OF REENLISTMENT PREREQUISITES
I. General. Marines requesting reenlistment who do not meet those prerequisites inparagraph 4102 may be considered for waivers unless waiver of the appropriate
reenlistment prerequisite is prohibited. Although the authority to waive reenlistment
eligibility criteria rests with either commanding generals or the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, it is a basic prerogative of subordinate commanders at each decision
level; i.e., company/battery, battalion/squadron, etc., to disapprove the waiver
request of any ineligible reenlistment applicant without forwarding it to the next
higher decision 1eOvelfor action, providing the Marine has been in the unit for a12-month period. However, such action is authorized only per guidelines established
by higher headquarters and providing an objective evaluation of the Marine's case was
accomplished under the "whole Marine" concept. Use the utmost discretion In granting
waivers. In each case, the good of the Marine Corps will take precedence. The waiver
process is not intended as a administrative addendum to reenlist unqualified
applicants. Extensions of enlistment do not require waivers except when involving
service limitations.
2. "Whole Marine" Concept. Apply this concept when deciding to submit or approve a
Marine's case for a waiver of reenlistment prerequisites. Judge the Marine's value to
the Marine Corps with objectivity considering each of the following criteria:
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a. Overall performance, past and present.
b. Individual initiative towards correcting the basis for ineligibility.
c. Future potential as a career Marine.
3. Commanding generals are authorized to grant waivers of certain reenlistment
prerequisites as indicated in paragraphs 4102.2 and 4102.3. This authority may not be
delegated. Waivers granted shall have been considered per the criteria established in
paragraphs 4103.1 and 4103.2 above. Requests for reenlistment incentives from first-
term Marines who have been granted a waiver of reenlistment prerequisites must arrive
at this headquarters endorsed by the commanding general granting the waiver or in
compliance with career planning management system (CPMS) or message format provisions
contained in figures 4-1 and 4-2, respectively. Commanding generals may waive the
following prerequisites for first-term Marines.
a. Possession of a user amount of any narcotic substance or dangerous drug
including marijuana (4102.2f refers).
b. Commandant of the Marine Corps imposed reenlistment restrictions (4102.2k
refers).
c. Court-Martial conviction (4102.21 refers).
d. Convictions by civil authorities (4102.2m refers).
e. More than two nonjudicial punishments (4102.2n refers).
f. Less than a minimum conduct and duty proficiency mark average of 4.0/4.0,
respectively (4102.2o refers).
g. Less than a high school graduate or alternative credential holder. (4102.3b
refers).
h. Less than ageneral technical (GT) composite score of 80 for a high school
raduate or alternative credential holder or less than 95 for nonhigh school graduate
4102.3c refers).
4. Waiver Request Format. When required, forward requests for waiver of reenlistment
prerequisites to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMEA-6) via the chain of command
using a NAVMC 10842. Include the following:
a. A positive recommendation from the commanding officer.
b. Copies of service record book pages 3, 9, 11, 12, and 13 if applicable.
Submit page 5 only on sergeants and below or SNCO's with lost time.
c. Copy of Record of Service on corporals and below. Only submit it on sergeants
with less tnan 2 years time in grade at the time of request.
d. Current photograph of the Marine (paragraph 4102.2e waivers only).
e. Any additional favorable or unfavorable material deemed by the commander
pertinent to tne request, not to include recent fitness reports. These must be sent
to Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMPE) per MCO P1610.7.
5. A request for waiver of physical examination for immediate reenlistment only must
be based on the fact that a medical officer of the Department of Defense is not
available and there Is no evidence In the member's health record of recent illness or
injury. If a waiver of physical examination Is granted, have medical personnel
holding the Marine's health record make an entry on the chronological page (SF-600).
6. In those cases where a waiver has been granted, a physical examination by a
Department of Defense medical officer shall be obtained at the earliest opportunity,
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Code When Assigned Remarks
RE-lA Recommended and eligible No restriction to reenlistment. Meets
all prerequisites, to include women
Marines discharged at EAS while
pregnant who would otherwise be
eligible.
RE-lB To corporals/sergeants with Recommended for reenlistment.
satisfactory performance records. Marine's eligibility for reenlistment
Released at EAS due to needs of determined by the CMC. Assigned due
Marine Corps. May only be assigned to career force management require-
by CMC. ments. May only be assigned by CMC.
SRB entry required stating reason for
assignment. Individual Marine must
sign the SRB entry. CMC authority
required for reenlistment.
RE-2A Transferred to FMCR prior Recommended and eligible for
to reaching maximum service reenlistment at time of transfer
limitation for grade. to FMCR.
RE-2B Retired. Not eligible for reenlistment. For
disability or transfer to the
Temporary Disability Retirement List
(TDRL) assign RE-3P.
RE-2C Transferred to FMCR at maximum Not eligible for reenlistment at time
service limitation for grade. of transfer to FMCR.
RE-3A Failure to meet general technical Recommended by CO upon removal
score prerequisite. Assign when of disqualifying factor. SRB entry
single disqualifying factor. required stating reason for assignment.
Individual Marine must sign the SRB
entry. CMC authority required for
reenlistment.
RE-3B Assign when there is a military or SRB entry required stating reason for
civil record of in-service drug assignment. Individual must sign the
involvement and there is potential SRB entry. CMC authority required for
for further service, reenlistment.
RE-3C When directed by CMC or when not SRB entry required stating reason for
eligible and disqualifying factor assignment. Individual Marine must
is not covered by any other code. sign the SRB entry. CMC authority
required for reenlistment.
RE-3E Failure to meet education standards. Recommended by CO upon removal of
Assign when single disqualifying disqualifying factor. SRB entry
factor only. required stating reason for assign-
ment. Individual Marine must sign the
SRB entry. CMC authority required for
reenlistment.
RE-3F Failure to complete SRB entry required stating reason for
recrult training, assignment, to include women Marines
discharged due to pregnancy prior to
completing recruit training.
Individual Marine must sign the SRB
entry. CMC authority required for
reenlistment.
RE-311 Hardship Discharge Assign when discharged pursuant to MCO
P1900.16, MARCORSEPMAN, chapter 6.
SRB entry required stating reason for
Figure 6 -2.--Reenlistment Eligibility Codes.
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assignment. Individual Marine must
sign the SRB entry. CMC authority
required for reenliatment.
RE-3N Pregnancy, Single parenthood. A woman Marine discharged prior to her
EAS for pregnancy or any Marine
separated while in a sole parent
status. SRB entry required stating
reason for assignment. Individual
Marine must sign the SRB entry. CMC
authority required for reenlistment.
RF-30 Refused orders assigned without SRB entry required stating reason for
sufficient obligated service assignment. Individual Marine must
remaining, sign the SRB entry. Refer to MCO
1300.8. This code may only be
assign i when directed by CMC
and is not to be assigned to first-
term Me-ines. CMC authority required
for reenlistment.
RE-3P Failure to meet physical (medical Recommended by CO upon removal
standards (includes pseudofolliculitis of disqualifying factor. SRB entry
and weight standardsj. required stating reason for
assignment. Individual Marine must
sign the SRB entry. CMC authority
required for reenlistment.
RE-4 Not recommended for reenlistment. SRB entry required stating reason for
assignment. Individual Marine must
sign the SRB entry. This code may be
assigned in lieu of any RE-3 code
(except RE-3B and RE-3F) if the
Marine's performance warrants and the
reason can be documented.
RE-4B Assign when there is a military or SRB entry required stating reason for
civil record of in-service drug assignment. Individual Marine must
involvement and there is no sign the SRB entry.
potential for further service.
NOTE: A reenlistment eligibility code of RE-3 is by definition considered recommended
but not eligible for reenlistment for the reason indicated by the designated
letter.
T
Figure 6-2.--Reenlistment Eligibility Codes--Continued.
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